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The ‘Sanctuary City’ Syndrome  
Reaches Arbitration:  State Supreme Courts 
Defy Federalization 
 
by Thomas E. Carbonneau 
 
“Obdurate Opposition: As children eventually 
learn as they progress toward adulthood, permitting 
intense anger to invade the human spirit in the face of 
disagreement only brings momentary personal relief. 
A fit of temper harbors feelings of guilt, but no 
resolution. It mistakes monologue for dialogue and 
substitutes irrationality for self-control. It quickly 
becomes a self-inflicted exile and could lead the 
group to which the individual belongs to disown its 
member. The chaotic burst of emotions is a false 
attempt to reconcile the contradistinctive human need 




A.  In New Hampshire: Finn v. Ballentine 
 
In Finn v. Ballentine,1 the parties disagreed 
about the monetary consequences of the termination 
of one of the company’s founders and then CEO. The 
facts involved two separate arbitrations that addressed 
the aftermath of the corporate ‘push out’. As a 
 
1Finn v. Ballentine Partners, 169 N.H. 128 (N.H. 2016).  
(The factual account that follows in the text is distilled from 
various parts of the record in the court’s opinion.  It has been 
substantially reorganized and rewritten). 
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founder of the company, Finn owned nearly 40% of 
the company shares. There were four shareholders in 
addition to the two founding members of Ballentine 
Finn & Company. Ballentine and the four 
shareholders claimed that Finn’s termination was for 
cause and exercised their right under the Shareholder 
Agreement to purchase Finn’s shares “at the price 
assigned to ‘for cause’ terminations . . . .” BFI 
(Ballentine Finn & Company, Inc.) gave Finn a 
promissory note for her shares in an amount that 
represented a sum less than their current fair market 
value. Before the first arbitral tribunal, Finn contested 
the legitimacy of her firing and the amount BFI 
offered for her shares. The arbitrators determined that 
Finn’s removal was unlawful and increased the 
amount of the purchase price of the shares by nearly 
25% (from the company’s offer of $4,635,684 to 
$5,721,756). The arbitrators further determined that, 
for reasons of liquidity, the company could make 
periodic payments over a number of months to satisfy 
the damages ordered in the award.     
In order (at least, in part) to pay Finn, BFI 
engaged in a corporate re-organization. It established 
BPLLC, transferring to it all of its assets and some of 
its liabilities. BFI was the sole member of BPLLC. 
Thereafter, BFI renamed itself Ballentine & Co. It 
sold a 40% membership interest in BPLLC to 
Perspecta Investments, LLC. Perspecta paid 
$7,000,000 for its participation in BPLLC and also 
made a capital contribution of $280,000 to BPLLC. 
The cost of the membership reflected a very 
substantial increase in the market value of the 
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company shares. Accordingly, Finn filed a motion to 
compel arbitration to recover a portion of the 
enhanced price of the shares. Finn claimed that 
Ballentine & Co. was unjustly enriched by the sale 
and that she was entitled to recover for her loss 
because of a ‘claw back’ provision in the Shareholder 
Agreement. 
The second arbitral tribunal concluded that 
Finn was entitled to relief on the basis of unjust 
enrichment and breach of contract. The arbitrators, 
however, dismissed the breach of contract claim 
because they concluded that that claim had already 
been considered and resolved by the first arbitral 
tribunal. Nonetheless, the arbitrators ruled that Finn 
was entitled to equitable relief because the company’s 
wrongful conduct prevented her recovery under the 
contract. The panel awarded Finn $600,000 in 
equitable relief. The court vacated that award under 
the state arbitration law on the grounds of ‘plain 
mistake.’ The court concluded that res judicata 
prohibited the awarding of damages, which had 
already been granted by the first arbitral tribunal. The 
damages were duplicative; double recovery was 
unlawful. Finn challenged the court ruling on the 
basis that—because the transaction implicated 
interstate commerce—the FAA and its less exacting 
review standard governed.   
On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
rendered a doctrinally significant opinion that 
addressed the issue of the federal preemption of state 
arbitration law. In doing so, the court articulated a 
new interpretation of the ruling in Hall Street 
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Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc.2  The new 
interpretation was calculated to counter and prevent 
the nullification of state law. The court’s advocacy for 
the application of the ‘plain mistake’ vacatur ground 
in the state arbitration law was well-crafted, 
analytically sophisticated, and—to a degree—
persuasive. It introduced the concept of the ‘partial 
avoidance’ of federal preemption and made the case 
for the development of a larger regulatory role for 
state law in American arbitration. It effectively 
exploited the convolution of SCOTUS’ reasoning and 
 
2 Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).  See 
Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Rise in Judicial Hostility to 
Arbitration: Revisiting Hall Street Associates, 14 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 593 (2013); J. Keaton Grubbs, Justin R. 
Blount, & Kyle C. Post, Arbitration Agreements, Expanded 
Judicial Review, And Preemption—Hall Street Associates and 
NAFTA Traders, Inc.—A National Debate With International 
Implications, 24 SOUTH. L. J. 2 (2014); Richard C. Reuban, 
Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. 
L. REV. 1103 (2009); Kenneth R. Davis, The End of an Error: 
Replacing “Manifest Disregard” with a New Framework for 
Reviewing Arbitral Awards, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 87 (2012); 
Brian T. Burns, Freedom, Finality, and Federal Preemption: 
Seeking Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under 
State Law After Hall Street, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1813 (2010); 
Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Crumbled Difference Between Legal 
and Illegal Arbitration Awards: Hall Street Associates and the 
Waning Public Policy Exception, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 597 (2009); Matthew J. Brown, “Final” Awards 
Reconceptualized: A Proposal to Resolve the Hall Street Circuit 
Split, 13 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 325 (2013); Patrick Sweeney, 
Exceeding Their Powers: A Critique of Stolt-Nielsen and 
Manifest Disregard, and a Proposal for Substantive Arbitral 
Award Review, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1571 (2014). 
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indecision in Hall Street. The Court could only amass 
a majority through a series of trade-offs and 
compromises—at the price of not achieving even a 
modicum of doctrinal clarity. The features of Hall 
Street allowed the state court to ignore the thrust of 
the Court’s rulings in the federal preemption cases 
and to contradict and challenge the supremacy of the 
FAA in matters of arbitration.   
The ‘plain mistake’ ground for the vacatur of 
arbitral awards under New Hampshire’s arbitration 
statute permits courts, albeit in limited circumstances, 
to assess the merits of the arbitrator’s determinations.3 
Like ‘manifest disregard of the law’,4 it is a means by 
 
3 Finn, 169 N.H. at 142-145. 
4 On ‘manifest disregard’, see Michael H. LeRoy, Are 
Arbitrators Above the Law? The ‘Manifest Disregard of the Law 
Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137 (2011); Stephen L. Hayford, 
Reining in the Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard:  The 
Key to Restoring Order to the Law of Vacatur, 1998 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 117 (1998); Liz Kramer, Circuit Split Persists Regarding 
Whether Arbitrator’s “Manifest Disregard” Of Law Can Vacate 
Arbitration Award (June 25, 2015), available at: http://www.  
arbitrationnation.com/circuit-split-persists-regarding-
whether-arbitrators…/; Hiro N. Aragaki, The Mess of Manifest 
Disregard, 119 YALE L. J. ONLINE 1 (2009), available at:  
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-mess-of-manifest-disregard; 
Jason R. Brost, Court Rejects Claim That Arbitrator’s Ruling 




Thomas V. Burch, Manifest Disregard and the Imperfect 
Procedural Justice of Arbitration, 59 KAN. L. REV. 47 (2010); 
Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Reconsidering Arbitration: Evaluating 
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which courts can gauge the validity of the arbitrators’ 
application of law to the facts of the litigation and the 
‘accuracy’ of their interpretation of the governing law.  
The merits review of arbitral awards poses a 
significant challenge to arbitral autonomy5—a core 
feature of most contemporary arbitration laws and of 
the FAA, especially as reinterpreted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Merits review could be a ‘death 
blow’ to the arbitral process.    
There can be little doubt that the ‘plain 
mistake’ ground allows courts to look over the 
shoulder of arbitrators as they apply the law to the 
facts of the case. It subjects the recourse to arbitration 
to a more protracted and deeper contact with the 
judicial process, thereby depriving parties of the 
benefit of their bargain for arbitration. It reduces the 
functionality and effectiveness of arbitration and 
makes it a lesser adjudicatory alternative. It 
transforms the correction of legal error into a 
singularly important objective of judicial supervision.   
 
the Future of the Manifest Disregard Doctrine, 21 SOUTH. L. J. 
41 (2011); William H. Hoofnagle III & Byran W. Horn, 
Vacating Arbitration Awards for Manifest Disregard of the Law 
(May 2013), available at: http://ascelibrary.org/doi/full/10.1061/ 
(ASCA) LA. 1943-4170.0000110/: Tom Ginsburg, The 
Arbitrator as Agent: Why Deferential Review Is Not Always 
Pro-Arbitration, 77 CHI. L. REV. 1013 (2010); Stephen Wills 
Murphy, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under State 
Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 887 (2010); Karen A. Lorang, Mitigating 
Arbitration’s Externalities: A Call for Tailored Judicial Review, 
59 UCLA L. REV. 218 (2011).  
5 See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 27-30, 90 (4th ed. 2017). 
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Awards are reduced to the status of being just 
another adjudicatory determination—no longer the 
product of a categorical and powerful legal policy that 
elevates arbitration to a constitutional necessity.  
More aggressive judicial supervision enhances the 
risk of reversal for awards because arbitrators are 
unlikely to apply the law in the customary lawyerly 
way. The brief for merits review also does not take 
into account the ever-present judicial disagreement 
about the meaning and application of law in particular 
cases. It would seem that arbitrators as adjudicators, 
who additionally are not bound by stare decisis, 
should be given at least the same degree of 
professional freedom as judges. After all, they 
perform a very similar function.   
The New Hampshire High Court’s justification 
for its support of the state statutory ground was drawn 
not only from Hall Street, but from Volt Information 
Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. Trust. Stanford Univ.6 as well—
the two cases being anomalies in the Court’s 
decisional law on arbitration.  In Volt, the Court stated 
that “the FAA . . . does [not] . . . reflect a 
congressional intent to occupy the entire field of 
arbitration.”7 This assertion was uncharacteristic of 
the Court’s prior and future holdings on 
arbitration. The statement was used by the Volt Court 
to justify an atypical and bizarre holding on the 
federalization issue that undermined the objective of 
establishing a uniform national law on arbitration. The 
New Hampshire court took advantage of these 
 
6 Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
7 Id. at 477. 
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doctrinal irregularities and used them to justify the 
application of the state law provision on vacatur.   
In Hall Street, the Court aligned its opinion 
with the observation in Volt about the limited role of 
federal law in the field of arbitration by constricting 
the range and role of contract freedom in American 
arbitration law and limiting the parties’ options for 
review to the stipulated statutory grounds.8 The Hall 
Street Court also made the equally unusual comment 
that there are frameworks other than the FAA for 
securing the judicial review of arbitral awards—in 
particular, a more aggressive form of review than the 
limited review available under FAA §10.   
Specifically, it asserted that state laws could 
provide that more rigorous review. (“We do not agree 
. . . that the FAA is the exclusive method by which to 
review . . . [arbitral] award[s]. . . .”9); (“If the FAA 
were, in all circumstances, the exclusive grounds for 
review of arbitration awards subject to the FAA, these 
possible alternative paradigms of judicial review that 
the Court described would have been completely 
foreclosed.”10 [Emphasis added]). These declarations 
in atypical arbitration cases (Hall Street and Volt) 
were made by a clearly divided court. That 
disagreement became the aperture through which the 
New Hampshire court reintroduced state authority 
into the legal framework for the regulation of 
arbitration. 
 
8 Hall St., 552 U.S. at 590. 
9Finn, 169 N.H. at 138. 
10 Id. at 139. 
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Acknowledging that the FAA contains less 
invasive grounds for supervising arbitral awards than 
the state basis of ‘plain mistake’, the New Hampshire 
court ruled that: 
[W]e conclude that §§9-11 of the 
FAA apply only to arbitration review 
proceedings commenced in federal courts 
. . . when the contract to arbitrate affects 
[interstate] commerce. . . . Section 2 of 
the . . . [FAA] applies in state courts to 
prevent anti-arbitration laws from 
invalidating otherwise lawful arbitration 
agreements. . . . However, it does not 
follow that the FAA applies to state 
courts in its entirety. In fact, the Supreme 
Court has suggested that some of the 
statute’s provisions apply only in federal 
courts. . . . [T]he Court noted that . . . 
‘§§3 and 4 . . . by their terms appear to 
apply only to proceedings in federal 
court’. . . . This comment clearly 
contemplates that the Court considers the 
application to the states of each section 
individually, rather than the application 
of the Act as a whole. . . .11 
[ . . . ] 
 
[T]he Supreme Court . . . has 
described the primary purpose of the 
FAA as ‘foreclos[ing] state legislative 
 
11 Finn, 169 N.H. at 138. 
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attempts to undercut the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements.’12 
 
[ . . . ] 
 
[T]he Court emphasized that ‘[t]he 
overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to 
ensure the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements according to their terms so as 
to facilitate streamlined proceedings.’13 
 
The New Hampshire court may have accurately 
represented the surface meaning of the SCOTUS 
pronouncements in eccentric decisions, but it ignores, 
perhaps deliberately, the key feature of the Court’s 
doctrine that would invalidate the state court’s view of 
the role of state laws in the regulation of arbitration.  
It avoids considering the Court’s primary motivation 
for preempting state law in arbitration. In its analysis, 
the state court never refers to the “emphatic federal 
policy favoring arbitration”14—the Court uses this 
policy (which it itself discovered in the FAA and 
proclaimed to be the linchpin concept of American 
arbitration law) to fill the holes in, and answer the 
difficult questions about, the federal law on arbitration 
and to set the direction for the development of 
American arbitration law. In point of fact, the Court’s 
 
12 Finn, 169 N.H. at 140. 
13 Id. 
14 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Freedom and Governance in 




recognition of the narrow scope of the provisions in 
the FAA (§§3 and 4) testifies to the ad hoc,15 
circumstantial, and—at times—imperfect conceptual 
content of the Court’s doctrine on arbitration, but 
those attributes do not alter or negate the fundamental 
principles of federal arbitration law dictated by the 
Court’s ‘emphatic federal policy.’   
To buttress the credibility of its analysis in the 
quoted statements, the state court reasons, albeit 
syllogistically, that even SCOTUS (in Volt and Hall 
Street) recognized the restrictive character of the 
FAA’s jurisdictional and substantive scope.  
 
15 The California courts are particularly fond of emphasizing 
the language of FAA §§ 3 and 4 as a means of restricting the 
jurisdictional reach of the federal statute.  See, e.g., Engalla v. 
Permanante Medical Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997); 
Cable Connection, Inc., v. DirecTV, Inc., 190 P. 3d 586 (Cal. 
2008). The Court gave rise to this trend in Moses H. Cone Mem. 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983) 
when it stated that the FAA was “something of an anomaly. . . .  
It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and 
regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does 
not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction. . . .”  
The Court then referred specifically to FAA §§ 3 and 4. It 
acknowledged that the enforcement of the Act was “left in large 
part to the state courts. . . .”  See James Zimmerman, Note, 
Restrictions on Forum-Selection Clauses in Franchise 
Agreements and the Federal Arbitration Act: Is State Law Pre-
empted, 51 VAND. L. REV. 759, 764 (1998); Stephen L. Hayford, 
Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983-1995: A 
Sea Change, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 10 (1996); cited in 
Paul Turner, Preemption: The United States Arbitration Act, the 
Manifest Disregard of the Law Test for Vacating an Arbitration 
Award, and State Courts, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 519, 520 n.2 (1999). 
12 
 
According to the state court, the statute is applicable 
only in cases governed by federal law. It does not, 
however, substantiate that statement analytically or 
with references to actual cases. Moreover, the court 
asserts that the fundamental objective of the FAA is to 
foster the enforcement of arbitration agreements by 
shielding them from inhospitable state statutes 
(“Section 2 of the [federal] act applies in state courts 
to prevent anti-arbitration laws from invalidating 
otherwise lawful arbitration agreements.”). In the state 
court’s assessment, award enforcement (as opposed to 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements) is not part 
of the FAA’s fundamental objectives. The statement 
is calculated to act as the foundation for the 
remaining, even more unconventional, analysis. Be 
that as it may, it is inconceivable that enforcement of 
the result of an arbitration is of lesser importance to 
the fulfillment of the ‘emphatic policy’ than the 
institution of the proceeding through the parties’ 
agreement. 
The New Hampshire High Court focuses upon 
SCOTUS’ least hospitable rulings on arbitration and, 
from their unique content, fabricates a wishful 
framework for salvaging the role of state law in the 
regulation of arbitration. The distinction between 
arbitral agreements and awards that SCOTUS implies 
in Hall Street is a means to an end—a fragment of 
legal reasoning that upholds and eventually justifies a 
doctrinal conclusion, i.e., extinguishing the effects of 
contract freedom at the enforcement stage of the 
arbitral process.  For the state court, then, substantive 
judicial review becomes, somehow, part of the 
13 
 
‘emphatic federal policy’ and, therefore, a fully lawful 
means by which to regulate the arbitration process. 
The New Hampshire court reinterprets the forced 
distinction between arbitral agreements and awards 
(articulated in Hall Street) to create room for its 
restrictive state law on arbitration. The actual federal 
arbitration law strongly disfavors merits review 
because it allows courts to second-guess arbitrators.   
           Such a practice robs arbitration of its 
operational autonomy for the sake of promoting 
would-be legally correct substantive results. It is 
evident that both the front and back-end of the arbitral 
process are equally vital to the operation of 
arbitration. In fact, without enforcement, the entire 
alternative adjudicatory process would collapse and 
become useless and ineffective. Pyrrhic victories may 
have some symbolic value, but—by definition—they 
are obtained at an excessive price. Finality and 
fairness are the trademarks of useful and resorted-to 
adjudication.   
When the state court declares—disingenuously 
citing other SCOTUS rulings16 that, in reality, are 
unqualifiedly favorable to arbitration—that the 
“overarching purpose”17 of the federal statute on 
arbitration “is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate 
streamlined proceedings,”18 it tendentiously ignores 
how crucial enforcement is to any system of 
adjudication. SCOTUS does not ignore the 
 
16 Finn, 169 N.H. at 140-142. 




fundamental importance of enforcement to 
arbitration—not in Volt, not in Hall Street. Despite a 
few foibles, SCOTUS’ determinations are, in the 
main, intended to achieve a uniform and, therefore, 
workable and effective law of arbitration.19 While a 
few weaker cases20 emerged from an embattled Court, 
the policy favoring arbitration was never in doubt or 
question. For its part, the state court arbitrarily 
manipulates and dilutes the FAA in order to attribute 
a controlling function to state law in matters of the 
enforcement of arbitral awards.   
The Court creates an unsanctioned and 
previously unknown concept of ‘qualified 
preemption’: limited and unlimited preemption of 
state law by the FAA.21 The contrivance allows the 
court to declare, at least in theory, that the FAA has 
only a conditional impact on the vacatur and 
confirmation of awards.22 According to the state court, 
 
19 The Court’s opinion in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman 
Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995), is particularly instructive in 
this regard.  There, the Court qualified the absolute contract 
freedom doctrine in Volt to ensure that the exercise of contract 
freedom resulted in arbitrability.  See also BG Group v. 
Argentina, 572 U.S. 25 (2014).   
20 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); Bernhardt v. 
Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Commonwealth Coatings 
Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968); Volt Info. 
Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Hall St. Assocs., v. 
Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l, 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
21 Finn, 169 N.H. at 142-143. 
22 Id. at 143. 
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if preemption is based upon a conflict of regulatory 
objectives between state and federal statutes, state 
laws cannot simply be automatically displaced or 
voided; they can still regulate award enforcement as 
long as the statutory conflict is not a ‘fundamental’ 
clash between regulatory schemes.23 Some restrictive 
state laws on arbitration, in the court’s view, are no 
more than venial impediments to the FAA’s control 
over arbitration.24 As with the Discover Bank 
Rule25—a provision that the Court invalidated in 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,26—federal law 
preempts restrictive state laws that apply 
disproportionately to arbitration contracts when they 
function as “a thinly veiled refusal to enforce 
arbitration agreements.”27   
Another serious failing of state laws is their 
promotion of class litigation through statutory 
provisions or decisional rulings that prohibit, directly 
or indirectly, waivers of the right to engage in class 
proceedings.28  As SCOTUS observed in Concepcion, 
these outlawed waivers can have the beneficial effect 
of preventing arbitrating parties from converting a 
bilateral arbitration into a class proceeding.29  State 
laws should permit class action waivers to obviate the 
 
23 Finn, 169 N.H. at 142. 
24 Id. 
25 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, 113 
P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2000). 
26 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
27 Finn, 169 N.H. at 140. 
28 Id. at 141. 
29 Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
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possibility that the party intent to engage in bilateral 
arbitration is ignored.30  State laws cannot generally 
prohibit arbitration contracts, expressly or impliedly, 
and apply limitations disproportionately to them and 
place their legitimacy in doubt.  According to the state 
court, outright or evident hostility to arbitration under 
state law cannot be tolerated, but a measured or 
moderate antagonism toward the arbitral process 
represents a normal exercise of the state’s political 
and regulatory authority.31  Drawing again selectively 
from Volt and anchoring its statement in the strained 
distinction between arbitration agreements and 
awards, the court declares: “ . . . state rules that slow 
or change [arbitral] procedures without the potential 
consequences of invalidating an arbitration agreement 
are not preempted.”32   
The state court further misreads or reinterprets 
the Volt opinion by describing the procedural rule of 
California state law33 that blocked the recourse to 
 
30  Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
31  Finn, 169 N.H. at 142. 
32  Finn, 169 N.H. at 140. 
33  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(C) (West 1982), cited in 
Volt, 489 U.S. at 471 n.3.  The Statute provided that a court 
confronted with two on-going and conflicting proceedings, both 
involving the same matter and the same parties, one being an 
arbitration, could resolve the conflict in one of four ways: (1) 
not enforce the arbitration agreement; (2) combine issues for 
joinder; (3) compel arbitration; or (4) stay the arbitration.  It was 
evident that the court used a state law of procedure to 
subordinate the arbitration to a judicial proceeding—a 




arbitration in Volt as a mere annoyance, devoid of 
truly consequential effect.34 Although it 
acknowledged that the FAA would provide a contrary 
result, the court claimed that the application of the 
California procedural rule only engendered a stay of 
the arbitration and not a nullification of the arbitration 
agreement.35 The distinction is transparently 
calculated to reach a foregone conclusion; moreover, 
it distorts actual reality. It ignores the incontrovertible 
fact that the postponement of the arbitration, in the 
end, will inevitably lead to its abandonment—if only 
for economic reasons, thereby rendering the 
arbitration agreement ineffective.  Such a result does 
frustrate the fundamental goals of the FAA.   
Again, characterizing the FAA’s chief objective 
as the enforcement of arbitration agreements and the 
elimination of “the judiciary’s long-standing refusal to 
enforce the agreements to arbitrate,”36 the state court 
adds that Congress did not see “expeditious review as 
a primary goal of the FAA.”37 The hair-splitting is 
deliberately meant to justify a single conclusion and is 
self-evidently specious. The court then reiterates that 
obstructing arbitration through state law rules is 
permissible as long as it is done in moderation: “The 
fact that a state law affecting arbitration is less 
deferential to an arbitrator’s decision than the FAA 
 
34  Finn, 169 N.H. at 141. 
35  Id. 
36  Finn, 169 N.H. at 141. 
37  Id. 
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does not create an obstacle so insurmountable as to 
preempt state law.”38 
Much of the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s 
advocacy, as noted earlier,39 is based on its reading of, 
and reliance upon, the majority opinion in Volt. Volt 
was an astonishing addition to the Court’s decisional 
law on arbitration; while the Volt Court touted 
contract freedom as a central pillar of American 
arbitration law, it cast substantial doubt on the Court’s 
willingness to pursue federalization and federal 
preemption in the area of arbitration.40 Displaying an 
unusually passive and disinterested attitude toward the 
regulation of arbitration, the Volt Court appeared 
willing to share power over arbitration with state 
courts and legislatures as long as the contracting 
parties commanded it in their agreement.41 The 
hegemony of federal arbitration law, it seemed, was 
not the primary objective of the federal enactment.   
 
38  Finn, 169 N.H. at 141. 
39  See supra text accompanying note 2. 
40  See, e.g., Arthur S. Feldman, Volt Information Sciences, 
Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University: 
Confusing Federalism with Federal Policy Under the FAA, 69 
TEX. L. REV. 691 (1991).  After the Federalism Trilogy, the 
decision in Volt to follow the state procedural regulation and 
void the reference to arbitration was unexpected.  In the wake of 
Volt, many commercial litigators concluded that the law had 
returned to a rule of non-preemption of state law and that the 
Court’s endorsement of arbitration was at an end.  Justice 
Thomas’ dissent in Mastrobuono was completely accurate: Volt 
and Mastrobuono could not co-exist.  Eventually, Volt would 
fade into the background and the mandate of arbitrability would 
become dominant.   
41  Volt Info. Scis. V. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
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A line of SCOTUS rulings following Volt, 
beginning with Mastrobuono42 and ending most 
recently with DirecTV v. Imburgia,43 re-established 
the vitality of federalization and federal preemption in 
the American law of arbitration and significantly 
moderated the Court’s absolute version of contract 
freedom. Now, parties could choose the governing 
law as long as it sustained the reference to 
arbitration.44 Ignoring that qualification and the other 
cases, the state court concluded that: “Volt 
demonstrates that not all obstacles to arbitration are 
repugnant to the FAA.”45 
According to the state court, unlike the 
California procedural rule at issue in Volt, the state 
law rule banning class waivers (the Discover Bank 
Rule) promoted multi-party litigation that constituted 
“an extreme alteration of arbitration procedure, risks, 
and efficiency.”46 The application of that rule in the 
circumstances of Concepcion could have had “such a 
profound effect” that parties would be discouraged 
from engaging in arbitration,47 thereby frustrating the 
FAA’s primary objective, i.e., the enforcement of 
arbitral agreements: “[T]he FAA does not preempt all 
state-law impediments to arbitration; it preempts 
 
42  Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52 
(1995). 
43  DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015). 
44  Finn, 169 N.H. at 141. 
45  Finn, 169 N.H. at 141. 
46  Id. 
47  Id. 
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state-law impediments to arbitration agreements.”48 
This analysis of the federal preemption doctrine was 
tailored to validate the New Hampshire provision 
permitting courts to review awards for ‘plain 
mistake.’ The court ignores the undeniable fact that 
the lack of award enforcement is the most substantial 
means of impeding the recourse to arbitration 
agreements. 
As noted earlier,49 the state court’s re-
interpretation of SCOTUS’ cases ignores the Court’s 
core doctrinal motivation.50 Over the years and cases, 
the Court felt impelled to produce a comprehensive 
and unitary body of legal provisions for the regulation 
of arbitration.  As noted several times elsewhere,51 the 
Court was not interested in arbitration for its 
intellectual and analytical worth.  For the Court, 
arbitration was an instrument of policy—a means of 
creating a process that provided effective civil 
litigation.52 The Court used its authority to create a 
shield by which to protect arbitration from adversarial 
litigation; subjecting arbitration cases to the standard 
litigation practices would have destroyed its systemic 
value entirely.53 The unbending clarity of its 
arbitration doctrine created a discipline that allows the 
process to function undisturbed. The Court was 
 
48  Finn, 169 N.H. at 141. 
49  See supra text accompanying note 2. 
50  Id. 
51 See, e.g., THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW IN 
A NUTSHELL 55-56 (4th ed. 2017). 
52  Id. at 55. 
53  Id. at 61-62. 
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rightly convinced that the finesse of legal exceptions 
and distinctions could only hinder the development of 
arbitration.54 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court wove its 
distinctions out of whole cloth. The twists and turns of 
the analysis did not mask the conclusory character of 
its reasoning. At least in terms of arbitration, it re-
ignited the great federalism debate about the standing 
of states’ rights in the federal system. The state court 
attempted to challenge federal hegemony on 
arbitration. Arbitration, however, had become 
indispensable to the constitutional integrity of 
American citizenship. In the American law of 
arbitration, there was only one concept of federal 
preemption, and its purpose was always to express, 
then to achieve, the ends of the ‘emphatic federal 
policy favoring arbitration.’ There were no partial 
(and, therefore, no admissible) trespasses on federal 
authority. A trespass was always a trespass. Effective 
laws were clear and unambiguous. They generally had 
an unambiguous focus on a single objective.   
The FAA, as written in 1925 or as rewritten by 
the Court since, has never had, and does not now 
have, contradistinctive regimes for regulating 
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards. As 
mentioned earlier,55 adjudicatory outcomes are 
meaningless when unenforceable. Through its 
decisional rulings, SCOTUS elaborated a functional 
regulation of arbitration that emphasized equally the 
 
54  See, e.g., THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW IN 
A NUTSHELL 71 (4th ed. 2017). 
55  See supra text accompanying note 11-13. 
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front and back-ends of the process—its two critically 
important stages. Whether astute or aberrant, the 
policy was equally unforgiving of all acts of non-
compliance and all attempts to deviate. There is no 
state right to regulate arbitration differently from the 
federal framework. If it applies, state law must 
conform to core federal requirements. Arbitration is a 
federal matter. The federal authority in arbitration is 
solid, firm, and unwavering.   
The New Hampshire High Court took pains to 
find a means of defending the state right to regulate 
arbitration. It did so by distorting the content and 
purpose of the SCOTUS decisions on arbitration. It 
engaged in a strained analysis that did not account for 
the essential thrust of the SCOTUS rulings. It 
constructed an ‘edifice’ that housed only its 
misguided and unlawful resistance to federalization. 
Its analysis attempted to displace a fait accompli. The 
‘plain mistake’ rule cautions arbitrators not to make 
mistakes in applying the law. They must emulate 
judges in their application of the law. Even though the 
parties bargained for arbitration, a court could rescind 
arbitrator rulings if it determined that they were 
wrong on the law and contained unacceptable legal 
errors. The primary impetus for the opinion in Finn v. 
Ballentine was SCOTUS’ unusual opinion and 
reasoning in Hall Street, along with its equally 
befuddling counterpart in Volt.   
In many respects, the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Finn v. Ballentine simply 
complied with the Hall Street Court’s directive that 
lower courts should assess the standing of manifest 
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disregard or like bases for the judicial supervision of 
arbitral awards.56 ‘Plain mistake’ could represent such 
a reassessment. The state court attempted to 
characterize review for ‘plain mistake’ as an 
exceptional action meant to maintain the integrity of 
arbitral awards. The ground is clearly intended to 
allow courts to examine and evaluate an arbitrator’s 
application of law: “Rather, although judicial review 
is deferential, it is the court’s task to determine 
whether the arbitrators were plainly mistaken in their 
application of law to the specific facts and 
circumstances of the dispute they were called upon to 
decide.”57 
The statutory ground in the state law allowed 
courts to require that arbitrators reach a would-be 
legally correct result or, at least, a result that was not 
plagued by an allegedly manifest or evident legal 
error. This circumstance, however, was not what the 
parties intended when they bargained for arbitration.  
Moreover, inviting judges to assess the arbitrators’ 
law application was a risky activity that could easily 
lead to untoward results and supervisory chaos. The 
court’s focus on federal preemption and state law was 
so intense that it failed to see the forest through the 
proverbial trees. What was left of arbitration’s appeal 
to parties after the ‘plain mistake’ restriction was 
applied? It demonstrated the wisdom of the SCOTUS’ 
intolerance of exceptions to its determinations on 
arbitration. A judicially supervised arbitral process, 
subordinated to the ‘rule of law,’ was unlikely to be 
 
56 Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
57 Finn, 169 N.H. at 146. 
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an effective alternative to court litigation. Echoing 
and paraphrasing the historical distinction between the 
submission and arbitral clause,58 the lack of arbitral 
autonomy would dissuade business interests from 
engaging in arbitration.  
  
B.  In Texas: NAFTA Trader v. Quinn 
 
In its opinion, the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court referred to a Texas case that provided support 
for the views and analysis expressed in Finn v. 
Ballentine. Both state courts adopted similar positions 
on federal preemption of state law. In NAFTA 
 
58 In the 19th century and through the early part of the 20th 
century, national legislation in a number of countries, e.g., 
France and Brazil, made the submission (the arbitration 
agreement for existing disputes) the lawful contract for agreeing 
to arbitration.  Courts believed that submitting future disputes to 
arbitration (through the arbitral clause) was a dangerous 
proposition because neither party knew what kind of disputes (if 
any) would arise.  This was the position argued by the 
concurring opinion in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438-39 
(1953).  It was ostensibly a paternalistic approach to the 
protection of legal rights.  In reality, it was a fig leaf by which to 
conceal a persistent and uncompromising judicial hostility to 
arbitration.  The modern law of arbitration reversed the status of 
the two agreements for arbitration.  These laws privilege the 
independence and autonomy of arbitration to maintain its 
effectiveness as an adjudicatory mechanism.  If the submission 
were the exclusive pathway to arbitration, few parties already in 
opposition would have sufficient motivation to agree to forgo 
court proceedings.  The point in the text is in a similar vein: if 
arbitration were not final and binding, it would have little, if 
any, appeal to disputing parties. 
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Traders, Inc. v. Quinn,59 the Texas Supreme Court 
rendered a decision that gauged the impact of Hall 
Street upon the federal preemption doctrine, the Texas 
Arbitration Act (TAA), and the function of contract 
freedom in Texas arbitration law. In Hall Street, 
SCOTUS held that the parties’ authority to define 
their recourse to arbitration ended with the rendition 
of the award.60 Texas law, however, permitted 
contracting parties to enter into special ‘opt-in’ 
agreements as part of their bargain for arbitration 
under which the parties agreed that courts could 
vacate awards if the arbitrator committed ‘reversible 
error’ in deciding the case. The parties’ agreement 
thereby reached into the award enforcement phase of 
the arbitral process—an area that Hall Street 
determined only courts could enter.   
Otherwise stated, the parties could agree to 
expanded judicial supervision in which the courts 
were authorized (or required by party command) to 
review the arbitrator’s dispositions on the merits. 
Because the Texas statute did not provide for vacatur 
on the basis of reversible error, it could only be 
instituted through party agreement.61 In effect, 
according to the Texas court, the contracting parties 
could agree to place the same limitation (review on 
the merits) on the arbitrator’s decisional power that 
applied to a judge’s ruling and thereby protect 
themselves from the risk of erroneous legal 
 
59 Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W. 3d 84 (Tex. 2011). 
60 Hall St., 552 U.S. at 586. 
61 Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 93. 
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conclusions.62 Such provisions had been outlawed in 
Hall Street.63 
‘Reversible error’ usually involved matters 
relating to the application of the governing law; it, 
however—albeit more infrequently, could refer to 
errors of fact as well. Generally, it was contrasted to 
‘harmless’ error. If it is discovered, reversible error 
would have a significant impact on the result of 
litigation. Like the choice-of-law or venue, its 
application could be outcome-determinative. The 
error committed by the adjudicator needed to be 
indisputable, profound, and grave, i.e., so substantial 
that the final determination was, as a result, unjust and 
should be rendered unenforceable. The error, in effect, 
extinguished the validity and enforceability of the 
result.64   
Clear and unmistakable bias by the decision-
maker or reliance on falsified (or otherwise corrupted) 
evidence were examples of possible reversible errors 
in judicial litigation. There needed to be unmistakable 
indicia that the adjudication could not satisfy minimal 
juridical standards. In the setting of arbitration, 
reversible error could mean that the arbitrator clearly 
and profoundly misunderstood crucial factual 
elements or the content or parts of the governing law 
such that the determinations in the award were both 
incongruous and—in fact—incapable of being 
 





comprehended by reasonable people given the issues, 
interests, and facts.65   
According to the Texas High Court, the Texas 
Arbitration Act included the possibility of regulating 
awards for reversible error by invoking the ground of 
excess of arbitral authority. Therefore, a finding that 
the arbitrators ruled either on a matter beyond their 
mandate or made a significant legal or factual error in 
their ruling would justify vacatur.66 The Texas 
Supreme Court further concluded that arbitrator 
reversible error or excess of authority overwhelmed 
the policy favoring arbitration because, when the 
parties so provided, reversible error contradicted a 
specific provision in the parties’ contract (that the 
determinations in the award be free of reversible 
error), deprived the parties of the benefit of their 
bargain, and prevented them from realizing their 
reasonable expectations under the agreement.67   
In effect, the Texas court allied itself to Justice 
Stevens’ dissent in Hall Street68 when it declared that 
contract freedom—the legal right of contracting 
parties to formulate their own protocol for (entry into, 
participation in, and exit from) arbitration—was at the 
heart of its opposition to Hall Street’s restriction of 
party prerogatives and to the imposition of that 




65 Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 93. 
66 Id. 




As a fundamental matter, Texas 
law recognizes and protects a broad 
freedom of contract. We have repeatedly 
said that/ ‘if there is one thing which 
more than another public policy requires 
it is that men of full age and competent 
understanding shall have the utmost 
liberty of contracting, and that their 
contracts when entered into freely and 
voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall 
be enforced by Courts of Justice’. /We 
find nothing in the TAA [Texas 
Arbitration Act] at odds with this 
policy.69  
* * * 
If we were to identify an essential 
virtue of arbitration, it would be that it is 
a creature of [party] agreement.70 
 
The court segregated its loyalty to doctrine on a 
governing law basis. When the court applied the FAA 
(because of party choice-of-law or the transaction 
involved interstate commerce), Hall Street was 
binding precedent and controlling. In this setting, 
‘opt-in’ agreements could not be enforced and the 
court was relegated to the application of the content of 
FAA §10 and the so-called common law grounds.71 
When the TAA governs the litigation, the court 
arrogated to itself the discretion to “reach [its] own 
 
69 Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
70 Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 95-96. 
71 Id. at 94. 
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judgment”72 about the meaning and applicability of 
the Hall Street ruling and its consequences for the 
rules of arbitration law articulated in the Texas statute 
and its underlying case law.73   
The state court’s analysis was in clear and 
complete opposition to SCOTUS’ doctrine on federal 
preemption as established by the case law decided 
after Volt—in effect, as stated earlier, a line of cases 
intended to rectify the impact of Volt on the 
elaboration of a uniform national law of arbitration.74 
The state court’s reasoning and conclusion clearly 
allowed a state law (through party agreement) to limit 
the autonomous operation of the arbitral process. The 
FAA established the cardinal principles of American 
arbitration law that had to be applied consistently 
throughout the legal system. The prohibition against 
the merits review of awards and the decisional 
sovereignty of the arbitrator were instrumental 
provisions in those principles. Since Volt, SCOTUS 
had shown steadfast intolerance for limiting 
arbitration through the imposition of state law 
constraints.75   
 
72 Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 91-92. 
73 Id. at 92. 
74 See supra text accompanying note 40.  The relevant case 
law consists of:  Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 
514 U.S. 52 (1995); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. 
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Doctor’s Associates, Inc., v. 
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 
v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 
346 (2008); DirecTV v. Imburgia, 136 S.Ct. 463 (2015). 
75 See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 
U.S. 440 (2006). 
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Review for reversible error integrated the 
substantive judicial review of awards into the 
regulation of arbitration. Because courts were familiar 
with this standard, they were more likely to apply it 
than manifest disregard and to use it to do a thorough 
review of the arbitrator’s conclusions on the law.76 It 
thereby would pose a greater challenge to arbitrability 
and the autonomy of the arbitrator in deciding the 
dispute. It represented a gross judicial trespass on the 
independence, autonomy, and functionality of 
arbitration. Moreover, it conflicted with the letter and 
spirit of the SCOTUS case law on arbitration. Once 
reversible error was incorporated into the judicial 
supervision of arbitral awards, what remained of the 
deferential discipline that simple error and even gross 
error in the application of law or the understanding of 
the facts by the arbitrator would not justify vacatur? If 
there was one approach in state law and another in 
federal law—and they are dichotomous—the federal 
law had to prevail under the preemption 
doctrine.77The Texas court, however, articulated a 
very different solution to the conflict. According to 
the court, when the parties agreed to limit the 
arbitrator’s decisional discretion, limited judicial 
 
76 “Clear error refers to a trial court’s judgment or action that 
appears unquestionably erroneous to the reviewing appellate 
court.”  Available at: http://definitions.uslegal.com/c/clearerror/.  
See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988); Teva 
Pharma. USA, Inc., v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. ___ (2015) (No. 
13-854), available at:  
http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/ 
574/13-854/.  
77 Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 91. 
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supervision under FAA §10 was superseded by that 
party provision. When review for reversible error was 
added to the mix by party agreement, the applicable 
law was irretrievably altered. In the court’s words, 
legal or factual errors by the arbitrator “directly 
contradict[ed] the parties’ express agreement.”78 
Judicial failure to follow party prescriptions would 
then “deprive [the parties] of the benefit of their 
reasonable expectations.”79 The party expectation “to 
limit an arbitrator’s power to err”80 gave the arbitrator 
“no more power than a judge”81 and thereby allowed 
contracting parties to manage their risk of exposure to 
arbitrator mistakes on the law or facts.   
The comparison of arbitrators and judges was a 
backhanded way of saying that judges and their 
rulings were, as a general rule, subject to appeal. If 
judges suffered this restriction of their power and 
decisional discretion, arbitrators (presumably inferior 
to the public servants) should be willing to tolerate a 
similar limitation. Moreover, constraining arbitrator 
discretion to decide loses any discriminatory character 
when it was demanded by the parties in their 
agreement. Contract freedom and party provision 
legitimized the containment and the legal limitation of 
arbitration. The core problem, implausibly ignored 
and dismissed by the Texas court, was that its 
reasoning and result were in flagrant breach of the 
well-settled federal law on arbitration. The statute 
 






thereby fulfilled the parties’ desire to obtain legally 
correct results by recognizing reversible error as a 
basis for vacating awards and expressed it as an 
excess of arbitrator authority.82   
Under Texas law, contract freedom was the 
first principle of the legal regulation of arbitration. 
Freedom of contract transformed the party agreement 
into the supreme law of arbitration. Both the law and 
the courts were on the sidelines and only entered the 
fray to enforce party intent or, when the latter was 
absent, they provided a default regulatory framework: 
 
[W]e agree that delay and resulting 
expenses are concerns that arbitration is 
intended, at least, to alleviate. But 
equally grievous is a post-arbitration 
process that refuses to correct errors as 
the parties intended, and of equal concern 
 
82 In reaching this conclusion, the Court ignored the 
distinctive contributions of each process to the adjudication of 
disputes.  Legally-correct determinations were the special 
province of the courts.  Unless the parties customized the 
process to their individual liking, arbitration provided a different 
adjudicatory service and product.  It also refused to 
acknowledge that, no matter how significant to the public 
interest and the public good it may be, litigation was also a 
service-providing industry.  Its ‘customers’ have a wide range of 
problems and needs.  Arbitral adjudication was not and should 
not be a blurred mirror image of judicial litigation.  Citizens 
with full legal capacity have the right to make choices about 
their own lives through contract.  Finally, as for many opponents 
of ‘federalized arbitration’, the court’s analysis at bottom 
represented a power struggle about which institution had the 
authority to decide. 
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is a civil justice system that allows 
parties an alternative to litigation only if 
they are willing to risk an unreviewable 
decision.83 
 
Further, the Texas court argued that an 
irreconcilable conflict existed between state and 
federal law in the context of arbitration and federal 
preemption “when state law . . . refuse[d] to enforce 
an arbitration agreement that the FAA would 
enforce[,]”84 unless (at least, under Texas law) the 
parties have agreed to a form of merits review of their 
arbitral awards. The court relied heavily upon the 
opinion in Volt to find ‘safe harbor’ for its ideas that 
deviated from the doctrine established by the 
‘emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration.’ It 
sought to establish and buttress states’ rights, non-
national-uniformity proposition that state laws of 
arbitration could lawfully establish a more restrictive 
regulation of arbitration than the federal law. Echoing 
its New Hampshire counterpart, the Texas court stated 
that: “The lesson of Volt is that the FAA does not 
preempt all state-law impediments to arbitration; it 
preempts state-law impediments to arbitration 
agreements.”85 By dividing the FAA into two separate 
parts (like the New Hampshire court), the Texas court 
found the safe haven it sought for the application of a 
less hospitable state law of arbitration.  In its view, the 
selective preemption that arose from an exclusive 
 
83 Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 91. 
84 Id. at 93. 
85 Id. at 95. 
34 
 
focus upon arbitration agreements gave state laws of 
arbitration a much wider regulatory scope.86 That 
conclusion was both true and illegal. 
The Texas court gave the opinion in Volt an 
untoward significance in the elaboration of American 
arbitration law, presenting it as critically significant to 
the preservation of state authority in the regulation of 
arbitration. While courts and commentators generally 
perceived the case as wrongly decided,87 the Texas 
High Court saw Volt (again, like its counterpart in 
New Hampshire) as the source of a limited 
preemption doctrine that tolerated well the 
coexistence of state and federal laws on arbitration.88 
Accordingly, partial state law limits on arbitrability 
were permissible. As the New Hampshire court would 
state in Finn v. Ballentine, the California procedural 
provision in Volt was not preempted because it merely 
‘stayed’ (rather than dismissed) the agreed-upon 
arbitration proceeding. Moreover, the parties had 
selected California law as the governing law.89 “The 
parties’ agreement was enforced, not thwarted, by 
application of the California law they had chosen.”90   
After all, an unusually inhospitable and 
unsupportive U.S. Supreme Court proclaimed in Volt 
that the FAA was not the only framework for 
 
86 Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 98. 
87 See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 52-55, 141, 163-65, 195, 386 (4th ed. 2017). 
88 Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 99-100. 
89  Id. at 99. 
90  Id. at 100. 
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regulating arbitration.91 It coexisted with several 
different legal regimes that provided a variety of 
requirements and outcomes—a theme at the heart of 
the later decision in Hall Street.92 The parties in their 
contract could select the governing regime and 
customize their recourse to arbitration. They could 
also agree to a governing law for the transaction and 
the arbitration. The courts’ task was to enforce the 
parties’ contract as written.93 There was no policy 
imperative associated to arbitration but contract 
freedom and the principle of pacta sunt servanda: 
“The Supreme Court concluded that the FAA’s 
purposes and objectives are not defeated by 
conducting arbitration under state-law procedures 
different from those provided by the federal statute.”94 
The state court then emphasized a feature of the 
FAA that restricted its range of application. FAA §§3 
and 4 were specifically directed to federal courts 
alone, leading to the undeniable conclusion that “§§3 
and 4 of the FAA apply only in federal court.”95 The 
New Hampshire court reached the same conclusion.96 
The Texas court added that “Section 10 of the FAA, 
the basis of the decision in Hall Street, is itself 
 
91  See Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 473 
(1989). 
92  See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 589 
(2008). 
93 See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION IN A 
NUTSHELL 161 (4th ed. 2017). 
94 Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 99.    
95 Id. at 99-100 n.71. 




addressed only to ‘the United States court in and for 
the district wherein the award was made.’”97 Further, 
the U.S. Supreme Court had itself acknowledged the 
anomalous circumstance that, although the FAA 
established a federal right to arbitrate, it did not create 
federal question jurisdiction.98 These various textual 
features of the statute made its extension to state 
courts and legislatures a lesser imperative. Still 
ignoring the presence and overwhelming force of the 
‘emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration,’ the 
Texas High Court reached, what is at this point, the 
foregone conclusion that: 
 
The lesson of Volt is that the FAA 
does not preempt all state-law 
impediments to arbitration; it preempts 
state-law impediments to arbitration 
agreements. . . . The only reasonable 
reading of . . . Hall Street . . . is that the 
FAA does not preempt state law that 
allows parties to agree to a greater review 
of arbitration awards. . . . The TAA . . . 
permits parties to agree to expanded 
review, or to a corresponding limit on the 
arbitrator’s authority, as in this case, but 
it does not impose such review on every 
arbitration agreement. . . . The matter is 
left to the agreement of the parties.  But 
 
97 Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 99-100. 
98 See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. 




absent clear agreement, the default under 
the TAA, and the only course permitted 
by the FAA, is restricted judicial 
review.99 
 
This ‘lesson’ is only possible if the Federalism 
Trilogy100 and the extensive case law decided in the 
aftermath of Volt are ignored.101 The Texas court 
engaged in a deliberately selective perusal of the 
relevant decisional law to prove its point that limited 
state law intrusions upon the regulation of arbitration 
were tolerable under federal law. The strategy was 
virtually identical to the approach of the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court.102 The analysis was a case 
study in calculated legal advocacy; it followed the 
letter of the SCOTUS doctrine on arbitration only to 
corrupt its soul. In many respects, the reasoning 
represented a return to Wilko v. Swan103 (a difficult 
choice between would-be competing policies), 
Gardner-Denver104 (some statutory rights are exempt 
from arbitrability), and Commonwealth Coatings105 
(some legal regulations must apply to the arbitral 
 
99 Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 100-101. 
100 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 
(1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses 
H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).  
101 See also note 74 supra; THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, 
ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL 76 (4th ed. 2017). 
102 Finn, 169 N.H. at 134, 138. 
103 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
104 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
105 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 
393 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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process to safeguard its use and integrity), and it 
echoed the 9th Circuit’s persistent opposition to the 
federal law of arbitration106 because it depreciated the 
professional work of the courts and the social mission 
of the law. 
The Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court 
filed a concurring opinion107 in which he took a 
critical view of arbitration from another, less 
analytically-oriented, and more policy-driven 
perspective. The assessment makes the case for the 
importance of the law in all societies and argues that 
the privatization of legal litigation through arbitration 
may be a costly, unsuitable solution to the systemic 
problems it seeks to correct.108 Both sides of the 
Texas court see arbitration as an inadequate and 
approximative remedy to the problems of civil 
adjudication, while the U.S. Supreme Court assesses it 
as the exclusive and indispensable means of 
correcting the dysfunctionality of civil litigation in the 
American legal system and in the process of trans-
border litigation.109 
 
106 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 279 F.3d 
889 (9th Cir. 2002). 
107 Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 102-04. 
108 See id. at 102-03. 
109 The civil or public servant’s answer to problems is nearly 
always adequate funding.  It is an overly facile approach that 
recommends a solution that is as bad as the problem it addresses.  
As the ‘war on poverty’ demonstrated, throwing money at a 
problem achieves virtually nothing.  To the extent it generates 
gratitude, it may garner votes.  It seems to enrich primarily the 
administrators.  The Chief Justice, however, is more persuasive 
in his advocacy for changes in trial procedures.  Nonetheless, for 
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According to the concurring opinion in NAFTA 
Traders: 
Increasingly, our civil disputes are 
submitted to the private sector rather than 
a judge or jury. The trend is neither 
intrinsically good nor bad, but there are 
consequences. When a case is tried in 
open court, rules of evidence . . . dictate 
what facts a jury may properly consider. 
The proceeding is recorded, and 
dispositive rulings are subject to 
principles of error preservation. . . . An 
arbitration is different. . . . I write only to 
observe that our system is failing if 
parties are compelled to arbitrate because 
they believe our courts do not adequately 
serve their needs. If litigation is leaving 
because lawsuits are too expensive, the 
bench and the bar must rethink the 
crippling burdens oppressive discovery 
imposes. If courts have yet to embrace 
modern case-management practices, the 
legislature should ensure that the justice 
system has resources to improve 
technology and to hire qualified 
personnel—two sure ways to improve 
efficiency. . . . [W]e must, in the future, 
address those aspects of our justice 
system that compel litigants to 
 
reasons of lawyer training and established practices, the 
SCOTUS recourse to arbitrability is more convincing. 
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circumvent the courts and opt for private 
adjudication.110 
 
In a more recent case (Hoskins v. Hoskins),111 
the Texas Supreme Court held that the enumerated 
grounds for vacatur in the TAA are exclusive at least 
from the perspective of the statutory text itself. If the 
parties do not provide for a particular type of review, 
the statutory grounds and limited review apply.112  
With a contractual ‘assist’ from the parties, the 
explicit statutory standard controls. Therefore, 
common law grounds, like manifest disregard of the 
law, are not available for vacating awards under state 
law.113 The parties in Hoskins had agreed that the 
governing arbitration law would be the TAA.  The 
court cited one of its prior cases to establish that 
“‘[b]ecause Texas Law favors arbitration, judicial 
review of an arbitration award is extraordinarily 
narrow.’”114 Later, the court concluded that “the TAA 
leaves no room for courts to expand on . . . [the 
enumerated] grounds”115 and these enumerated 
statutory grounds “do not include an arbitrator’s 
manifest disregard of the law.”116 The court compared 
the circumstances of this case with its precedent in 
NAFTA Traders and found the circumstances to 
 
110 Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 102-04. 
111 Hoskins v. Hoskins, 497 S.W. 3d 490 (Tex. 2016). 
112 Id. at 495. 
113 Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 102, 103, 104. 
114 Hoskins, 497 S.W. 3d at 494. 
115 Id. at 494-95, 495-96. 
116 Hoskins, 497 S.W. 3d at 495, 496. 
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warrant a separate and distinct legal analysis and 
conclusion: 
 
The arbitration agreement in [Hoskins] 
contained no restriction (either directly or 
indirectly) on the arbitrator’s authority to 
issue a decision unsupported by the law.  
Unlike the reversible-error challenge to 
the award in NAFTA Traders, Leonard’s 
manifest-disregard complaints cannot be 
characterized as assertions that the 
arbitrator exceeded his powers.117 
 
[. . .] 
 
Thus, our holding in NAFTA Traders 
does not support Leonard’s broad 
contention that parties may obtain 
vacatur of an arbitration award on a 
common-law ground that is not 
enumerated in the TAA. To the contrary, 
we recognize in NAFTA Traders that 
“the default under the TAA . . . is 
restricted judicial review. . . .”118 
 
[. . .] 
 
[U]nless a statutory vacatur ground 
is offered, the Court shall confirm the 
award.  . . . [W]e may not rewrite or 
 
117 Hoskins, 497 S.W. 3d at 494. 
118 Id. at 495. 
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supplement a statute to overcome its 
perceived deficiencies. The parties 
signed an agreement to arbitrate under 
the TAA, and that agreement contained 
no limitations on the arbitrator’s 
authority beyond those enumerated in the 
statute. . . .119 [Emphasis in the original]. 
 
The concurring opinion provided the following 
assessment of the significance of the Hoskins ruling: 
 
Our holding that the TAA’s 
vacatur grounds are exclusive establishes 
that manifest disregard and, for all 
practical purposes, all other common-law 
vacatur doctrines are no longer viable 
with regard to arbitrations governed by 
the TAA./ [W]e avoid the sort of 
quagmire that surrounds . . . the . . . 
FAA./ [Because of the restrictive review 
under the enumerated grounds]. [N]o 
glosses on . . . [the] statutory bases, no 
smuggling common-law in through the 
back door—and no judicial 
intermeddling with the Legislature’s 
carefully circumscribed bases for judicial 





119 Hoskins, 497 S.W. 3d at 495-496. 
120 Hoskins, 497 S.W. 3d at 498, 500. 
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C.  In California 
 
(i) Cable Connection v. DirecTV 
 
Like the New Hampshire Supreme Court, the 
Texas High Court in NAFTA Traders drew inspiration 
for its analysis and doctrine from California 
decisional law—a jurisdiction open to an extensive 
utilization of ADR yet leading the judicial opposition 
to SCOTUS’ ‘progressive’ rulings on arbitration.121  
California law, therefore, displays opposing 
tendencies in its embrace of the legal policy on 
alternatives to judicial litigation: open to novel 
approaches to dispute resolution, on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, an ardent advocate for the 
importance of the traditional work of the judiciary and 
its mission to maintain the social order.122 Both state 
and federal courts in California have helped to create, 
guide, and nurture the resistance to the SCOTUS’ 
 
121 See, e.g. Jones v. Citigroup, Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461 (Ct. 
App. 2006); Szetelav. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Ct. 
App. 2002); Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct. 
App. 1998); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
76 (Cal. 2005); Southland v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584 
(Cal. 1982).  For characteristic Ninth Circuit decisions, see 
Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates, 553 F.3d 1277 
(9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 145 (2009); Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002); Craft v. 
Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999); Duffield v. 
Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998). 
122  See, e.g., Armendariz v. Fdn. Health Psychare Servs., 
Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (Cal. 2000). 
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elaboration of a vital role for arbitration in civil 
litigation.123 
The California High Court has been steadfast in 
its opposition to the hegemony of the FAA, the 
application of the federal preemption doctrine to 
matters of arbitration, and the permissive character of 
the federal judicial policy on statutory arbitrability. It 
believes that state law—in particular, legislation to 
repair the inequities in society and the contract 
defenses to the enforcement of adhesive 
contracts124—should govern the issues that arise from 
arbitration agreements and the arbitral process in 
cases within the territorial boundaries of the state.125 
The advocacy for state law is especially unyielding 
when there is no firm basis or categorical reason to 
justify the jurisdiction of federal law. At the very 
least, state law should not be completely eclipsed in 
litigation involving contract relationships between 
citizens of the state or that implicate state interests or 
commercial enterprises. By the fact of its election, the 
state government possesses the sovereign authority to 
make law within and for the state—a right of self-
determination (or freedom) that can be mitigated by 
federal law (the Bill of Rights and the Supremacy 
Clause) only in the face of the manifest violations of 
 
123  See note 121 supra. 
124  See, e.g., Smith v. Pacificare Behavior Health of Cal., 
Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 190 (Ct. App. 2001); Broughton v. Cigna 
Healthplans of Cal., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334 (Cal. 1999). 
125  See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 15 Cal. 
Rptr. 4th 951, 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997). 
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the Constitution.126 For preemption to take place, a 
state law must clash with the federal government’s 
core constitutionally-established law-making 
authority. To warrant dislodging or invalidating state 
law, the conflict must be both heretical and brazen; it 
must attack the very principle of national political 
cohesion.   
In Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc.,127 
for example, the California Supreme Court set the 
opposition to Hall Street into motion. It described the 
case’s range of application as limited to cases 
involving federal law.128 It emphasized the Court’s 
own statement of the holding’s restrictions; in 
particular, the case did not ban the use of non-FAA 
frameworks for the judicial supervision of awards that 
permitted parties to agree to the enhanced review of 
arbitral awards.129 When the court refused to follow 
Hall Street in the interpretation of the state arbitration 
statute, it stated: 
 
The judicial system reaps little benefit 
from forcing parties to choose between 
the risk of an erroneous arbitration award 
and the burden of litigating their dispute 
 
126 The position restates the original Erie doctrine and 
ignores the impact of the subsequent political and economic 
development of the country, as well as the evolution of the 
doctrine itself.  See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION 
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 47, 76, 184 (4th ed. 2017). 
127 Cable Connection, Inc., v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586 
(Cal 2008). 
128 Cable Connection, 190 P.3d at 593. 
129 Id. at 599. 
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entirely in court . . . . There are also 
significant benefits to the development of 
the common law where arbitration 
awards are made subject to merits review 
by the parties’ agreement . . . . These 
advantages, obtained with the consent of 
the parties, are substantial.130 
 
(ii) McGill v. Citibank 
 
The California Supreme Court’s discussion of 
this and related legal issues in McGill v. Citibank,131 
was characteristically thorough. The analysis was 
methodical and well-organized. The court, however, 
demonstrated a sense of distinction so subtle that, 
once made, some of its distinctions became barely 
visible or comprehensible. They disappeared into the 
ether or overwhelmed the intellect. Moreover, at 
several points in the opinion, the court’s ideological 
and political agenda peered through the cloud cover of 
doctrinal considerations. Throughout the discussion of 
the law, either impliedly or expressly, the High Court 
distinguished between the public and private domain 
and, concomitantly, between the rules that arose from 
regulatory law and those that emerged from private 
contracts.132 The discussion strongly suggested that 
governmental interests and activities were the 
paramount concerns of the legal system and that they 
could dislodge, even overrule, privately-formulated 
 
130 Cable Connection, 190 P.3d at 601. 
131 McGill v. Citibank, 393 P.3d 85 (Cal. 2017). 
132 McGill, 393 P.3d at 89. 
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rules.133 In the court’s view, enacted legislation was a 
manifestation of the sovereign political will of the 
state government and could not be diminished or 
altered by the exercise of private contractual 
authority. Establishing the rule of law and defining 
public policy were within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the elected and appointed government.134 
The state court saw its primary task in McGill 
as establishing a legal basis for the application of state 
law and preventing the encroachment of federal law 
and jurisdiction. Within the territory of the state, its 
citizens had a right to be governed by state law, and 
state law should be the source of governing legal rules 
and controlling political values.135 The idea of 
contract freedom and the obligation of enforcing 
arbitration contracts could be, and was, replaced by an 
allegiance to locally legislated law and the local 
mores of judicial adjudication. The constitutional 
supremacy of federal law could and needed to yield, 
at times and on some issues, to state territorial 
sovereignty, especially in litigation involving the 
application of state law to the interests of state 
residents.   
To a not insignificant degree, the McGill 
opinion and related determinations reignited the 
discussion of states’ rights that attended the 
formulation of the Articles of Confederation and later 
 
133 McGill, 393 P.3d at 93-94. 
134 Id. at 92. 
135 Id. at 93-94. 
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the U.S. Constitution.136 The states’ rights issue is 
akin to the ideological turmoil that today accompanies 
the debate about sanctuary cities, illegal immigration, 
the commander-in-chief powers, the Paris agreement 
on the environment, and the seemingly unending 
efforts to delegitimize current political institutions and 
the founding values of the Republic. Without seeking 
to address any of these controversies directly, it is 
nonetheless clear that the strident clash of positions 
threatens to unravel federalism, full faith and credit, 
and integrity of national political fabric.   
Federalism generally fosters a strong central 
government and is the purveyor of unity within the 
country. Current circumstances have shaken the very 
foundation of well-settled political principles and 
practices. The hostility and defiance are so intense 
that they even raise the specter of secession. The 
national government is likely strong enough to quell 
any acts of true insurrection—so one hopes. The 
policy on arbitration is part of the pursuit of national 
goals and interests. It arose from federal efforts to 
restore the right to redress grievances to the American 
citizenship.137 Such an objective could not be attained 
without the galvanizing force of federal preemption. 
A cogent and uniform national law on arbitration was 
instrumental to arbitral autonomy and the 
effectiveness of the arbitral process.138 Effective 
 
136 See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 76 (4th ed. 2017).  
137 Id. 
138 See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 
F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959). 
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arbitral adjudication could not have been realized by a 
weak federal policy. Without federalism and federal 
preemption, U.S. citizenship would have been altered 
and depreciated. While unitary national policies have 
a negative impact on local rights, the addition of 
federalized arbitration law to U.S. citizenship was 
vital to its constitutional integrity. Effective civil 
adjudication is an intrinsic and vital part of 
democratic governance.   
The McGill ruling advocates for a form of state 
sovereignty and independence that undermines the 
federalization of American arbitration law and the 
arbitral process’ operational effectiveness.  McGill 
represents a larger decisional law that opposes the 
intrusion of the ‘emphatic federal policy favoring 
arbitration’ upon California state sovereignty and self-
governance.139 The Ninth Circuit also has been part of 
the resisting group. Its opinions indicate that the court 
deeply resents the privatization of adjudication and 
the substitution of arbitral methods for traditional 
judicial procedures.140   
Despite its long-standing opposition, the Ninth 
Circuit appears to have reassessed—at least to some 
extent—its position on the federalization issue. In 
Kilgore v. KeyBank, N.A.,141 in contrast to the 
reasoning in McGill, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
FAA preempted the Broughton-Cruz rule, which 
prohibited the arbitration of claims for injunctive 
relief under the California Unfair Competition Law 
 
139  McGill, 393 P.3d at 95. 
140  See supra text accompanying note 15. 
141  Kilgore v. KeyBank, 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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(UCL).142 While avoiding a direct confrontation with 
Kilgore, the McGill court reached a contrary result by 
focusing on another aspect of the litigation. It drew a 
distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ injunctive 
relief and aligned that distinction with an alleged 
provision in the arbitration contract that extended the 
waiver of ‘public injunctive relief’ to any type of 
adjudicatory proceeding.143 Despite its conjectural 
character, this reasoning allowed the state court to 
attribute an inviolable public policy character to the 
relevant consumer protection legislation and thereby 
excluded it from the reach of arbitral jurisdiction. The 
latter outcome directly contradicted the result 
mandated by federal preemption. 
In light of Kilgore and the current federal 
arbitration practice,144 had the Ninth Circuit decided 
McGill, in all likelihood, it would have commanded 
that the question of arbitrability be submitted to the 
arbitrator to determine the parties’ intent on this 
 
142  California Code, Business and Professions Code – BPC 
§17200, available at: http://codes.findlaw.com/ca/business-and-
professionscode/bpc-sect-17200.html; Kent J. Schmidt (Dorsey 
& Whitney LLP), What is California’s Unfair Competition 
Law?—the Michael Scott explanation, available at:  
http://www.lexogy.com/library/detail.aspx? g=26df0acf-ef9d-
4ffa-8bcb-d59c0686837/; Carlton A. Varner & Thomas D. 
Nevins, California Antitrust & Unfair Competition Law (3d ed. 
2003); Jeremy B. Rosen, California: Unfair Competition Law, 




143 McGill, 393 P.3d at 90-91.  
144 See supra text accompanying note 141-43. 
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question, as reflected in the contract for arbitration. 
This outcome is the characteristic result in the federal 
decisional law on arbitration, as confirmed by the 
ruling in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter.145 In 
contrast, the California Supreme Court in McGill 
avoided assessing Kilgore and the arbitrability 
question; rather, it cast the problem in terms of 
limitations on contract freedom and the creation of 
private rights. It determined that contracting parties 
could not lawfully agree to waive their right to seek 
public injunctive relief in all adjudicatory frameworks 
because of the substantial public interest in the 
regulatory law. The California statutes in question in 
McGill were the following: the Consumers Legal 
Remedies Act (CLRA); the unfair competition law 
(UCL); and the false advertising law. Arbitrators 
could not adjudicate or interfere with the political 
rights that arose from the state’s exercise of 
governmental authority on behalf of its citizens.146 
The McGill court also believed that SCOTUS 
exaggerated the significance of the FAA in its case 
law. Implied by this perspective was the additional 
view that the hyperbole that surrounded the FAA and 
the ‘emphatic policy’ was more of a sales pitch than 
serious analytical thinking.147 It may have been 
wishful thinking, but the state court was convinced 
that the reality of arbitration did not match the Court’s 
description. Moreover, it was the state court’s 
conviction that the public purpose underlying the laws 
 
145 Oxford Health Plans, LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2013). 
146 McGill, 393 P.3d at 91-93. 
147 McGill, 393 P.3d at 93-94. 
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enacted by the state legislation could not be 
diminished, frustrated, or contradicted by private 
contractual references to arbitration.148 Additionally, 
the court seemed to distrust the arbitrators’ ability to 
apply the law, and to question the corporate parties’ 
motivation for their recourse to arbitration.149 
Arbitration had become a means of avoiding judicial 
rulings and legal remedies. In the court’s view, the 
law should function to correct the inequality between 
parties and the abuse of position by large commercial 
enterprises.150   
In addressing the issues in McGill, the state 
court never acknowledged SCOTUS’ objective of 
having arbitration provide citizens with a functional 
and effective process of civil litigation. Also, it failed 
to recognize that SCOTUS’ purpose in fostering 
preemption was to create a single American 
arbitration law. Fifty-one arbitration statutes would 
create a horde of qualifications, exceptions, and 
variations that would rob the arbitral process of its 
autonomy and practical utility. Both the reasoning and 
result in McGill are foregone conclusions calculated 
to conceal, but also to achieve, the aim of 
reintegrating state sovereignty and law into the 
regulation of arbitration.   
In McGill, Sharon McGill was a Citibank credit 
card customer. On the basis of that status,151 she 
purchased insurance from Citibank, known as a 
 
148 McGill, 393 P.3d at 94, 95. 
149 Id. at 93-94. 
150 Id. at 93. 
151 McGill, 393 P.3d at 87-88. 
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“credit protection plan,” which was intended to 
provide customers with insurance protection from 
catastrophic events that prevented them from earning 
an income or a sufficient one (e.g., unemployment, 
hospitalization, divorce, or long-term disability). 
McGill paid a monthly premium to Citibank for the 
plan, the amount of which was based upon her credit 
card balance: the higher the debt, the greater the risk, 
and the more costly the premium.   
In 2001 and 2005, Citibank issued a notice of 
change to the terms and conditions of credit card 
accounts. In 2001, the company added a number of 
arbitral clauses to cover various aspects of the 
commercial relationship. These clauses allowed either 
party to file a demand for the arbitration of “any claim 
. . . [or] dispute,” attributed to the arbitrator the 
authority to interpret the arbitration agreement, 
broadly defined the types of claims that were 
arbitrable, and prohibited any type of class or 
representative action.   
Both the 2001 and 2005 notice contained ‘opt-
out’ provisions. These agreements had become a 
commonplace feature in adhesive arbitration 
agreements because the California courts often 
concluded that these agreements rectified the 
bargaining imbalance between the parties. They 
permitted the customer to reject the proffered arbitral 
clause and to use the credit card for the remainder of 
the contract term. McGill did not exercise her ‘opt-
out’ privilege in either circumstance.   
A curious feature of the litigation record noted 
and emphasized by the state court was the accord 
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reached by the parties during court proceedings. They 
allegedly agreed that the various arbitration 
agreements prohibited customers “from pursuing 
claims for public injunctive relief, not just in 
arbitration, but in any forum [including a court of 
law].”152 [Emphasis in the original]. This statement 
would prove decisive to the outcome of the case. 
Having lost her job in 2008, McGill began to 
incur higher amounts of debt on her card. In 2011, she 
filed a class action against Citibank because of the 
way it marketed the customer protection plan and how 
it processed McGill’s individual claim. She contended 
that Citibank engaged in deceptive advertising and 
violated the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), 
the California Unfair Competition Law (UCL), and 
the California False Advertising Law. The trial court 
ordered McGill to arbitrate her claims except those in 
which she sought public injunctive relief. The 
appellate court reversed that decision, concluding that 
McGill should arbitrate all of her claims against 
Citibank. It asserted that the SCOTUS ruling in AT&T 
Mobility v. Concepcion153 preempted the so-called 
Broughton-Cruz rule that had prohibited the 
arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief.154   
On appeal, the California High Court dismissed 
McGill’s first claim by refusing to address it on the 
basis that it was unnecessary to the litigation and 
unsupported by the facts. She had asserted that, 
contrary to the appellate court’s determination, the 
 
152 McGill, 393 P.3d at 87. 
153 Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
154 McGill, 393 P.3d at 88. 
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FAA did not preempt the Broughton-Cruz rule of 
inarbitrability.155 The state court may have wanted to 
avoid addressing the Broughton-Cruz rule issue, not 
because it fell outside the factual perimeter of the 
case, but rather because it did not want to affirm an 
arbitrability ruling with which it took exception 
(perhaps strong exception): that injunctive relief under 
California statutory was arbitrable. The Broughton-
Cruz controversy could be avoided or ignored because 
McGill’s second question resolved the entire litigation 
on its own and in a manner that conformed to the state 
court’s view of what a ‘correct result’ should be.   
In the second branch of her appeal, McGill 
argued that the arbitration agreements in the standard 
form bank service contract were unenforceable 
because they coerced her into surrendering completely 
“her right to seek public injunctive relief . . . .”156 
Although the record was devoid of direct 
substantiation, Citibank, according to the court, 
agreed with McGill’s representation about the arbitral 
clauses. The only textual representation made in the 
opinion about the would-be party agreement was the 
statement that “ . . . as Citibank states, the parties 
elected . . . to exclude public injunctive relief from 
arbitration . . . .”157 Rather than a mutual agreement to 
have the customer’s right to public injunctive relief 
waived in all adjudicatory settings, the parties 
appeared to engage in an effort to avoid most of the 
Broughton-Cruz inarbitrability rule and thereafter to 
 
155 McGill, 393 P.3d at 88. 
156 Id.  
157 McGill, 393 P.3d at 90. 
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have recourse to arbitration on all issues. Contrary to 
the court’s interpretation, the would-be party 
agreement did not support the claim that the customer 
should be deprived completely of any right to seek 
public injunctive relief. It is unclear how the court 
arrived at its conclusion or what the parties might 
have intended. 
The court’s interpretation of the McGill case’s 
second question was a means by which it could 
address the uneasy relationship between public 
regulation and private rights in arbitration doctrine. In 
effect, the court gave itself the opportunity to tackle 
the federal preemption of the Broughton-Cruz 
inarbitrability rule by ricochet, masking its 
conclusions on that issue as part of its resolution of 
the other issue of litigation. The state court first noted 
that all three consumer protection statutes that 
provided the foundation for McGill’s claim 
invalidated consumer waivers of the statutory 
protection because such waivers were “contrary to 
public policy and [were] unenforceable and void.”158 
Moreover, at least one of the statutes—the false 
advertising law—gave standing to both government 
officials and aggrieved customers to seek relief under 
its framework. This factor reinforced the public policy 
character of the enactment.159  
The court then appropriated and expounded 
upon a distinction made in Broughton-Cruz between 
‘private injunctive relief’ and ‘public injunctive 
relief.’ The former resolved private disputes, and the 
 
158 McGill, 393 P.3d at 89. 
159 Id. at 89-90. 
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latter mostly benefitted the public as a whole and only 
“incidentally” (“if at all”) individual private citizens:  
“ . . . public injunctive relief under the UCL, the 
CLRA, and the false advertising law is relief that has 
‘the primary purpose and effect’ of prohibiting 
unlawful acts that threaten future injury to the general 
public. . . .”160 With this observation, the court 
ascended to the pulpit of public policy, so it could 
rescue the hapless and unfortunate customer from the 
abusive and self-interested behavior of the private 
bank.   
If the adhesive arbitration agreement 
completely excluded the parties’ right to pursue 
public injunctive relief, the court would be justified in 
declaring the arbitral clause invalid and unenforceable 
under state law. The waiver of public injunctive relief 
through an arbitral clause “would seriously 
compromise the public purpose the statutes were 
intended to serve.”161 Under the California Code, “. . . 
a law established for a public reason [could] not be 
contravened by a private agreement.”162 The latter 
statement is a familiar principle in civil law legal 
systems. In contrast to their common law 
counterparts, civilian legal systems give both the law 
and traditional litigation the highest station in the 
legal process.163 Moreover, as stated earlier, the public 
 
160 McGill, 393 P.3d at 90. 
161 McGill, 393 P.3d at 94. 
162 Id. at 93. 





injunctive relief available under the CLRA, UCL, and 
the ‘false advertising’ law were “primarily ‘for the 
benefit of the general public’. . . .”164 
The California Supreme Court then advanced 
several criticisms of the federal policy and doctrine on 
arbitration, even though it was only addressing 
McGill’s second argument which related to contract 
language. The state court argued that the federal 
doctrine on arbitration was based upon an “overbroad 
view of the FAA.”165 In interpreting the FAA, the 
state court advised federal courts to place greater 
emphasis on the ‘savings clause’ in FAA §2, 
providing that arbitration contracts were subject to 
ordinary contract defenses like unconscionability.166 
The ‘savings clause’ opened the door to state contract 
law and the unconscionability defense prohibiting 
arbitration agreements from forcing a contracting 
party to waive a public law right.   
Moreover, in virtually complete contradiction 
with the SCOTUS case law, the state court asserted 
that the congressional purpose underlying the FAA 
 
CivilLawTraditions.html; Civil law systems and Mixed Systems 
with a Civil Law Tradition, available at: 
http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/class-poli/droit-civil.php; 
Pyall Syam, What is the Difference Between Common Law and 
Civil Law?, available at: 
http://onlinlaw.wusl/edu/blog/common-law-vs-civil-law/; Civil 
law (legal system), available at:  
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Civil_law_(legal_ 
system)/.  
164 McGill, 393 P.3d at 94. 




was to “‘make arbitration agreements . . . as 
enforceable as other contracts, but . . . [not] more 
so.’”167 Legal rights that proceed from statutory 
enactments reflect the expression of public political 
authority. The court then made the highly suspect, 
likely inaccurate, contention that the FAA did not 
command the enforcement of arbitration agreements if 
those agreements contradicted or extinguished 
statutory rights.168 The application of an arbitration 
agreement could not deprive a contracting party of its 
statutory rights.  When the government acted, it acted 
on behalf of all of its citizens.169 The California vision 
of the law, courts, and arbitration differed radically 
from the federal analogue propounded by SCOTUS.  
  
(iii) Sanchez v. Valencia 
 
In Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co.,170 the 
California Supreme Court demonstrated an 
uncharacteristically accommodative attitude toward 
an arbitral clause in a consumer transaction. As in 
other similar cases, the critical question of legal 
doctrine centered upon the integration of the 
SCOTUS decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion171 
into (and its impact upon) the California state 
regulation of consumer transactions involving 
 
167 McGill, 393 P.3d at 94. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 94. 95. 
170 Sanchez v. Valencia Holdings Co., 353 P.3d 741 (Cal. 
2015). 
171 Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
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arbitration. The trial court denied the motion to 
compel arbitration, ruling that the class waiver and the 
remainder of the arbitration agreement were 
unenforceable. The court of appeals did not rule on 
the validity of the class action waiver, but concluded 
that both a provision for internal arbitral appeal and 
the arbitration agreement “as a whole” were 
“unconscionably one-sided” and, therefore, 
unenforceable.172 
At the outset of the opinion, the California 
Supreme Court expressed guarded approval of the 
decision in Concepcion by emphasizing its limited 
impact upon the state regulation of arbitration:   
 
While circumscribing the ability of 
states to regulate the fairness of 
arbitration agreements, Concepcion 
reaffirmed that the FAA does not 
preempt “‘generally applicable contract 
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability.’”  . . . Under the FAA, 
these defenses may provide grounds for 
invalidating an arbitration agreement if 
they are enforced evenhandedly and do 
not “interfere [] with fundamental 
attributes of arbitration.”173   
 
Therefore, the state regulation of arbitration was 
subject to federal preemption only if state rules 
overtly disfavored arbitration (arbitral autonomy, or 
 
172 Sanchez, 353 P.3d at 745. 
173 Sanchez, 353 P.3d at 745, 746. 
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arbitrability) by imposing special requirements on 
arbitration contracts or placing restrictions that 
interfered with the primary attributes of arbitration.   
The circumstances of Sanchez involved the 
purchase of a luxury car by a consumer (Gil Sanchez) 
from a California dealership (Valencia Holding 
Company of Valencia).174 The purchase price was 
nearly $54,000. The sales contract contained a 
relatively elaborate sui generis provision for 
arbitration, indicating that the dealership crafted the 
provision over time to reflect prior sales experience 
and avoid previous problems. The purchaser alleged 
that, at the time of sale, he had been inundated with 
documents which he was instructed to sign. The 
salesperson did not explain what the documents were 
but simply indicated where Sanchez needed to sign. 
Sanchez signed the documents without reading them. 
There was no opportunity whatsoever to negotiate.   
In particular, none of the dealership personnel 
alerted Sanchez to the presence of an arbitral clause or 
explained what the reference to arbitration meant or 
entailed in terms of consequences.175 The arbitral 
clause contained a class action waiver, required that 
the arbitrators—who would be selected according to 
the applicable arbitral rules—be “attorneys or retired 
judges” who would rule pursuant to law. The arbitral 
proceeding would be conducted in the federal district 
in which the purchaser resided. There could be two 
distinct but related arbitrations. The first arbitration 
was the standard proceeding, which applied to the 
 




adjudication of disputes that arose from the 
contractual relationship. Given the parties’ disparity 
of position, the dealership (if requested) was obligated 
to advance the buyer’s share of the costs of the 
arbitration with a maximum of $2500. The arbitrator 
could return the advance to either party at the time of 
the award. If authorized by the governing law, the 
arbitrator could also apply a ‘loser pays’ formula to 
the allocation of costs.176   
The second arbitration was an appellate 
proceeding that could be invoked only in two sets of 
circumstances by the affected party: (1) if the winning 
party in the standard proceeding did not receive 
monetary relief, or (2) if the losing party in that 
proceeding was ordered to pay damages in excess of 
$100,000 or the award contained injunctive relief. 
Moreover, an award of punitive damages could be re-
tried by a three-member arbitral tribunal. The 
requesting party would be responsible for the fees and 
costs of arbitration subject to possible later 
reapportionment by the arbitral tribunals. The parties 
further stipulated that arbitrations held under the 
agreement would be “governed by the Federal 
Arbitration Act.”177 
The arbitral procedure described in the 
adhesive arbitral clause contained protections for both 
parties (but to different degrees and for different 
reasons). The parties’ position in the contract 
relationship identified which provisions had been 
written to benefit them in particular. The first ground 
 
176 Sanchez, 353 P.3d at 746. 
177 Sanchez, 353 P.3d at 747. 
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for arbitral appeal could only be used by the buyer, 
and the second ground was likely to be used only by 
the seller. The advance of costs partly assisted the 
buyer who was forced to arbitrate, and the possibility 
of an eventual reimbursement of the advance in the 
award protected or favored the seller’s interests. Three 
factors indicated that the drafting party was 
determined to avoid the legal process and legal 
procedures because they believed they were 
antagonistic to its business interests: (1) the reference 
to punitive damages and injunctive relief, (2) the 
requirement that arbitrators be experienced legal 
professionals, and (3) the class action waiver.     
The provisions, however, also expressed a 
distrust of arbitrators by requiring legal accuracy and 
correctness in their rulings. This requirement limited 
the arbitrators’ decisional discretion.  These attributes 
of the arbitral clause indicated that the choice of 
arbitration was unilateral and one-sided—intended to 
protect primarily the seller’s interests. The 
consumer’s interests were present but much less 
apparent. To the extent that the arbitral provisions 
provided access to expert, efficient, economical, and 
enforceable adjudication, they benefited both 
parties.178   
Regardless of its real or theoretical benefits, the 
adhesive agreement for arbitration had little in 
common with a bilateral bargain. The parties’ ‘right to 
arbitrate,’ therefore, was unaffected by the party 
recourse to other remedies. In the face of the exercise 
 
178 Sanchez, 353 P.3d at 746-47. 
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of other contractual remedies, the ‘agreed-upon’ 
obligation to arbitrate disputes became merely an 
option (a discretionary right) and was not a binding 
legal duty. The arbitral clause was not a ‘tiered’ 
agreement, but rather a statement of options, 
depending upon how the parties (individually or 
collectively) evaluated the circumstances. 
Additionally, the arbitral clause would survive the 
lapsing, termination, or completion of the contract and 
the transaction, so any prospective or unresolved 
disputes would be submitted to arbitration. The 
obligation to arbitrate, in effect, transcended the 
contract and even the transaction. In the event that 
part of the arbitral clause was invalidated, the 
remainder of the clause could be enforced. If, 
however, the class action waiver was nullified, the 
entire arbitral clause would be nullified. The class 
waiver was absolutely material and indispensable to 
the bargain. In effect, the parties ‘agreed’ that any 
class litigation would be heard exclusively by a 
court.179   
The remainder of the arbitral clause described 
other forms of alternative non-judicial relief that 
‘coexisted’ with the parties’ ‘agreement’ to have 
recourse to arbitration. The parties could still have 
recourse to ‘self-help’ remedies, which again 
appeared to favor the drafting party more than the 
consumer. For example, repossession was authorized; 
it was a procedure of benefit exclusively to the car 
dealership. It hardly enabled the car buyer. Another 
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exemption from the obligation to arbitrate was the 
right to have recourse to small claims court 
proceedings, unless such a course of conduct would 
lead to the transfer of the dispute to another court. The 
sales contract was a one-page, double-sided document 
with small margins. It was thick with provisions. The 
bottom of the front page contained signatures, and a 
box with a black outline highlighted the arbitral clause 
on the bottom of the back page.180 
The court of appeals concluded that the 
arbitration agreement, especially the arbitral appeal 
provision, was “unconscionably one-sided.”181 As a 
whole, the arbitral agreement placed “an unduly 
oppressive burden on the buyer.”182 The court 
identified four aspects of the arbitration agreement 
that “made the agreement unfairly one-sided in favor 
of”183 the car dealership: (1) the possibility of appeal 
to a three-member tribunal when the arbitrators 
awarded more than $100,000; (2) the same possibility 
of appeal when the award included injunctive relief; 
(3) the requirement that the appealing party pay the 
costs of arbitration in advance; and (4) the exclusion 
of repossession from the arbitral procedure while 
submitting demands for injunctive relief. Each of 
these features favored primarily, even exclusively, the 
dealership’s position and interests.184   
 
180 Sanchez, 353 P.3d at 747. 
181 Id. at 745. 
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The court began its analysis with a thorough 
discussion of the California law of unconscionability. 
It cited a group of significant state cases on 
unconscionability.185 The court adopted a well-
reasoned approach to defining the term 
‘unconscionability.’ It emphasized that the meaning 
of the term was largely dependent upon 
circumstances. “An evaluation of unconscionability is 
highly dependent on context.”186 A definition was 
determined by a “sliding scale”187 that resulted from 
changes in the facts of the case and the interests of the 
parties. The controlling doctrine was well-settled; 
unconscionability consisted of two components—one 
procedural and the other substantive. How these 
 
185 Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 57 Cal. 4th 1109 
(2013) (Sonic II); Armendariz v. Fd. Health Psychare Serv., 
Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. 4th 
1519 (1997); Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 223 
(2012); Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Mkt. 
Develop., 55 Cal. 4th 223 (2012); Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 
38 Cal. 3d 913 (1985); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 
807 (1981); Washington Mutual Bank v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 
4th 906 (2001); City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 
4th 747 (2007); Mareno v. Sanchez, 106 Cal. App. 4th 1415 
(2003); Smith, Valentine & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 
Cal. 3d 491 (1976); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 
4th 148 (2005); Madden v. Kaiser Fd. Hosp., 17 Cal. 3d 699 
(1976); Gentry v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 443 (2007); Saika 
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Group, Inc., 15 Cal. 4th 951 (1997). 
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components interrelated varied in different situations. 
“[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract 
term, the less evidence of procedural 
unconscionability [was] required . . . .”188  Adhesion 
and unilateralism (take-it-or-leave-it or all-or-nothing 
‘bargains’) epitomized procedural unfairness in 
contract, and oppressive terms unacceptable to any 
reasonable person best described substantive 
unconscionability. Unconscionability could arise from 
a single contract provision or from the contract as a 
whole. It signified a coercive bargain that was a ‘bad 
deal’ for the weaker party—that, in fact, negated most 
of its interests and enhanced substantially those of the 
party who benefited from the bargain.189 
 The court asserted that a multitude of phrases 
hover around the idea of unconscionability, but they 
all fail to alight upon a true definition. The court 
mentioned a litany of “nonexclusive formulations” in 
its perusal of the case law: terms that are overly harsh, 
unduly oppressive, unreasonably favorable, unfairly 
one-sided, or shock the conscience.190 The law had 
been unable to identify a fully dispositive single 
expression or conclusive factor. The court sorted 
through the redundant and inconclusive phraseology 
by focusing upon an analytical framework (“[n]ot all 
one-sided contract provisions are unconscionable . . 
.”)191 and commercial utility, which it described as 
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“the mores and business practices of the time and 
place”:192  
 
Commerce depends on the 
enforceability, in most instances, of a 
duly executed written contract.  A party 
cannot avoid a contractual obligation 
merely by complaining that the deal, in 
retrospect, was an unfair or bad 




a contract can provide a ‘margin of 
safety’ that provides the party with 
superior bargaining strength a type of 
extra protection for which it has a 
legitimate commercial need without 
being unconscionable.194   
 
 The objective was to reach beyond “a simple 
old-fashioned bad bargain.”195 “Concepcion clarifies 
the limits the FAA places on state unconscionability 
rules as they pertain to arbitration agreements.”196 In 
arbitration cases, state unconscionability rules were 
subject to further limitations. They could not regulate 
arbitration contracts differently from other contracts 
 




196 Sanchez, 353 P.3d at 750. 
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or discriminate against them in the application of law: 
“even when facially nondiscriminatory, [such rules] 
must not disfavor arbitration as applied by imposing 
procedural requirements that ‘interfere [] with 
fundamental attributes of arbitration’ . . . .”197 Further, 
these rules must be “enforced evenhandedly.”198 
The court examined a number of considerations 
that might render the arbitration agreement so one-
sided that it became unconscionable.  In each case, the 
court concluded that the potential unfairness was 
inadequate to invalidate the arbitration agreement. 
Procedural unconscionability by itself was insufficient 
to render an arbitration agreement unenforceable. It 
only required that the court examine vigorously the 
terms of the contract for oppression of the weaker, 
imposed-upon party’s interests.199 The court 
determined that the one-sided features of the arbitral 
clause in the sales contract—in particular, the poison 
pill aspect of the class waiver provision and the self-
help remedies—were justified by their necessity in the 
business context and by the SCOTUS decision in 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion.200   
The court also addressed the recently-enacted 
state legislative requirement that arbitration be 
affordable to the weaker, imposed-upon party. It 
concluded that the standard demanded a serious 
evidentiary showing (which the plaintiff had not 
done). The purchase of a luxury car was hardly the 
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setting in which to accomplish the legislative goal of 
protecting the consumer who was relatively 
impecunious. The contract provision against 
injunctive relief was also justified because the 
granting of such a remedy could have a substantial, 
long-term negative effect on a business.201   
The court avoided addressing the status of the 
Broughton-Cruz rule, but nonetheless concluded that 
the rules of unconscionability must be enforced even-
handedly and could not disfavor arbitration in 
particular or interfere with its fundamental 
attributes.202 In this consumer arbitration case the 
California court rendered an opinion that was 
respectful of federal law, federal preemption, and the 
federal policy on arbitration. When compared to the 
court’s other rulings, it was an uncharacteristic 
opinion.   
 
(iv) More Movement in the Other Direction 
 
Two recent decisions, one rendered by the 
California Supreme Court and the other by the Ninth 
Circuit, suggest a possible shift in California law 
toward a more complete and less acrimonious 
acceptance of federalization and the federal doctrine 
on arbitration. In Sandquist v. Lebo Auto,203 the 
California Supreme Court rendered an opinion in 
which it applied the principles and rules articulated by 
SCOTUS in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 
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and then in a group of cases consisting of Howsam v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. 
Bazzle, Oxford Health Plan, LLC v. Sutter, and BG 
Group v. Argentina—cases that address the authority 
of courts and arbitrators to decide threshold 
jurisdictional issues in the arbitral process—in a 
straightforward and even cordial manner.204 The court 
did not elaborate any undermining distinctions to 
block the application of the federal law on arbitration. 
The state court’s discussion was in ‘lock-step’ with 
SCOTUS doctrine—especially the most recent 
holdings. The court asserted that the arbitrators had 
decided the disputes that the parties submitted to 
them—in particular, whether their arbitration 
agreement permitted or prohibited class action.   
Only the parties could eliminate the arbitrator’s 
threshold jurisdictional authority through their 
agreement. Unless the parties agreed to a Kaplan 
jurisdictional delegation clause, the court’s role was to 
decide whether the parties had entered into a valid 
agreement to arbitrate. The state court also embraced 
the Stolt-Nielsen–Concepcion assessment of class 
action in arbitration—i.e., the recourse to class 
arbitration negated arbitration’s informality, 
flexibility, economy, and expedition. Given the 
complex character of class proceedings, class 
arbitration also made procedural objections more 
 
204 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 
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likely and enhanced the risk of loss for the defendants 
because of the lack of judicial review.  The clash in 
remedial character made class arbitration an 
inapposite substitute for bilateral arbitration. Linking 
arbitration and collective lawsuits, therefore, was 
oxymoronic. 
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged in greater 
detail the unexpected and significant alterations in 
California arbitration law. In Tompkins v. 23 and Me, 
Inc.,205 the court engaged in a lengthy comparison of 
the federal and California law of arbitration with 
particular emphasis upon the decisions of the 
California Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit first 
referred to the SCOTUS decisional law on arbitration, 
reaching the following conclusions: 
 
1.   The FAA, in particular Section 
Two, embodies a congressional 
declaration of a liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration. As a result, the 
FAA’s primary objective is to secure the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements as 
they are written by the contracting 
parties. A rigorous enforcement policy 
will give effect to the party intent to have 
access to expeditious, efficient, effective, 
and economical proceedings. 
 
2.   Judicial precedent clearly 
establishes that the FAA’s national 
 




policy favoring arbitration also applies to 
the states and, in particular, to state 
courts. 
 
3.   The FAA prohibits any state law 
encroachment on the federal regulation 
of arbitration—either in the form of 
legislation directly or indirectly 
antagonistic to arbitration or through 
common law principles [i.e., decisional 
law, court rulings] that interfere with the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements 
according to their terms. 
 
4. The ‘savings clause’ is the only 
exception in the FAA to the validity of 
arbitration agreements. 
 
5. The application of the contract 
defenses in the ‘savings clause’ cannot 
disfavor arbitration clauses in particular 
or have a disproportionate impact upon  
arbitration agreements.206 
 
           The Ninth Circuit’s assertions accurately 
restate the federal law on arbitration.  
Unconscionability is obviously a matter of state 
contract law, but it establishes a potentially 
considerable limitation on arbitrability which the 
court represents as being difficult to establish under 
 




state law. The court then outlines the essential 
principles of arbitration that it believes have been 
articulated by the California Supreme Court: 
 
1. In adhesive arbitration, the law of 
unconscionability is the principal 
‘savings clause’ restriction on 
arbitrability. Under California law, 
unconscionability is established by 
fulfilling two requirements:  first, a 
procedural component that evaluates the 
parties’ unequal bargaining power from 
the perspective of oppression or surprise; 
second, a substantive component that 
assesses whether the unilateral ‘bargain’ 
yields overly harsh one-sided results.  
Both components must be present, but 
need not influence the transaction to the 
same degree. A bit more of one can 
counterbalance a lack in the other. 
 
2. Under California contract law, 
‘substantive’ unconscionability does not 
protect parties against a “simple old-
fashioned bad bargain” that they 
negotiated and to which they consented. 
It provides relief from terms that are 
unreasonably favorable to the more 
powerful party.  Moreover, the ‘context’ 
of the transaction is critical to 
determinations of unconscionability.   
            
75 
 
3. The contract defense of 
unconscionability applies 
indistinguishably to arbitration and non-
arbitration contracts. 
 
4. The contracting parties to an 
arbitration agreement may validly agree 
that the prevailing party shall be awarded 
attorney’s fees regardless of whether the 
dispute sounds in tort or contract. 
 
5. California Civil Code §1717 seems 
to validate ‘prevailing party clauses’ 
because it requires courts to consider all 
such clauses as bilateral provisions. This 
rule also applies to adhesive contracts. 
 
6. In mandatory arbitration—
meaning either unilaterally-imposed 
employment or consumer contracts in 
which the parties are uneven, the costs 
borne by the weaker party cannot exceed 
the court costs for such an action. 
 
7. The Armendariz rule for 
procedural fairness in arbitration 
proceedings is restricted to cases 
involving employment disputes. 
 
8. In consumer transactions, fee-
shifting clauses are not unconscionable 
unless the challenging party establishes 
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that appellate fees and costs, in fact, are 
unaffordable by the party and create a 
substantial deterrent effect to pursuing 
the action. 
 
9. The filing fees for arbitration 
(usually involving deposits for arbitrator 
administrator fees) are unenforceable if 
they are prohibitively high and thereby 
block all forms of redress, including 
arbitration. 
 
10. The California High Court has re-
evaluated the assumptions underlying its 
ruling in Armendariz to the effect that 
arbitration was an inferior form of 
adjudication. The court has asserted that, 
under both California and federal law, 
arbitral adjudication and judicial 
litigation are co-equal processes; 
substituting one for the other does not 
generate a disadvantage for either party. 
Any characterization by a state court or 
under state law that arbitration is a 
unique form of dispute resolution and, 
therefore, is unconscionable because it 
insufficiently protects legal rights is 
untenable. 
 
11. The state court has also established 
that a one-sided contract is not 
necessarily or presumptively 
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unconscionable. Such a contract can give 
the stronger party a ‘margin of safety’ or 
‘extra protection’ mandated by that 
party’s business activity. A one-sided 
contract is, therefore, not ipso facto 
unconscionable; in fact, the presumption 
goes toward the validity of such 
agreements. 
 
12. The state court has also 
acknowledged the separability doctrine 
and its beneficial impact on arbitral 
autonomy. A party opposing arbitration 
on the basis of contract validity must 
attack the arbitral clause directly. 
Moreover, the question of the validity of 
the arbitral clause shall be decided by the 
arbitrator.207 
 
           There are evident problems of definition 
created by the generality of the propositions 
(especially the first two, i.e., how do unreasonably 
unfavorable terms differ from ‘an old-fashion bad 
bargain’ and how is the proportionality between the 
two components of unconscionability to be 
measured). The foregoing assessment of the 
Californian judicial posture on arbitration differs 
substantially from the previous statement of the state 
law. It argues that the relevant California case law is a 
mirror image of its federal counterpart. The state law 
 




seems not only to embrace, but also to reinforce, the 
federalization of U.S. arbitration law as well as the 
attendant preemption doctrine.   
           There are at least two factors that dampen the 
positive appraisal of the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of 
the law. The federal court has only a territorial 
connection to the state law and has no real 
institutional standing to establish its content. It would 
have been more persuasive to read about the 
acceptance of the federal law principles in a California 
Supreme Court opinion. Be that as it may, the Ninth 
Circuit has persistently resisted the federal case law 
on arbitration and challenged its preemptive 
hegemony. The assessment, presuming it is highly 
likely to be accurate, may at least indicate the prospect 
of a fundamental change in California Ninth Circuit 
law. 
 The second factor of concern is, if there is 
change, is it merely episodic or a permanent shift of 
direction? Sandquist was unusual because of its 
conformity to federal law principles on arbitration. On 
the one hand, it may lack convincing precedential 
value. On the other hand, it could signal a moderation 
of the California judiciary’s antagonism toward 
federalized arbitration. Subduing the antagonism 
would greatly solidify the foundation of federal 
arbitration law and contribute substantially to arbitral 
autonomy. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit’s recent 
decision on class waivers favoring the NLRB’s 
position establishes that there are other points of 
serious federal dissent from the consecrated principles 
of the federal stance on arbitration. SCOTUS has 
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granted certiorari to a group of federal court cases 
that have addressed the NLRB position on class 
waivers. 
 
(v)  Florida: Basulto v. Hialeah 
 
The Supreme Court of Florida made a 
contribution to the growing state supreme court case 
law on arbitration. The court focused less on 
federalism and federal preemption. Instead, they 
concentrated on adhesive contracts for arbitration and 
formation and fairness issues. In Basulto v. Hialeah 
Auto,208 the court applied the controlling Florida 
precedent on the issue of unconscionability related to 
a motion to compel arbitration.209 An unconscionable 
arbitration agreement cannot support a motion to 
compel. The case involved Cuban immigrants who 
purchased a car from a dealership in Miami. Because 
the buyers neither spoke nor understood English, they 
were not aware of the terms of the sales contract and 
the arbitral clause it contained. In light of these 
circumstances, the Florida High Court concluded that 
the arbitration agreement was unenforceable—either 
an arbitration agreement did not physically exist, or it 
was both procedurally and substantively 
unconscionable.210   
The court was preoccupied with the would-be 
injustice of the circumstances. It never focused on the 
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legal questions generated by the facts. It did not 
consider the question of whether (and on what basis) 
arbitration was unsuitable for these consumers. At the 
very least, they knew they were buying a car. How 
much knowledge was enough? It also never raised the 
question of whether the issue of arbitrability should be 
decided by a court or submitted to an arbitrator 
appointed pursuant to the arbitral clause. As in 
Buckeye Check Cashing,211 the result was 
unequivocally clear to the court; the law mandated 
only one possible legal outcome. It freed the 
consumers of any responsibility because it believed 
that the agreement and transaction were void ab 
initio.212 The court’s decisiveness at least implied that 
the court believed that the consumers and their 
interests could only be safeguarded by the law and 
courts. The FAA would have preempted that belief 
and legal conclusion.   
What Florida law provides or how the courts 
apply it in these circumstances may violate the 
supremacy of the FAA—even though a state court is 
applying state law in a state case to a state transaction.  
There is no safe haven from the reach of the federal 
law of arbitration—except possibly the parties’ 
agreement when it seeks to contradict itself on the 
issue of arbitration and arbitrability. Be that as it may, 
the Florida court never referred to the supremacy of 
federal arbitration law, the ‘emphatic federal policy 
favoring arbitration,’ or the valuable role and impact 
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of arbitration on consumer arbitration. The court only 
saw a denial of fairness to resident aliens (perhaps 
also either nationals or tourists) who did not speak 
English. It concluded that the failure of English-
language communications meant that the parties had 
not entered into a contract or agreed to arbitration. 
“Because the buyers have not agreed to the arbitration 
terms within the Clause, they cannot be compelled to 
arbitrate their claims for monetary relief.”213 
This outcome may have been possible under 
Florida law, but the result was extremely unlikely to 
be reached under the FAA by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. The solution under Kaplan,214 Bazzle,215 and 
Sutter216 would have been to submit the arbitrability 
question to the arbitrator or to follow whatever 
prescription, if any, was contained in the parties’ 
agreement. The opportunity the consumers had to read 
the document or to retain a translator or to engage in 
the transaction with bilingual friends may have been 
enough to resolve any judicial question about the 
enforceability of the contract, leaving the matter of its 
binding character or the meaning of its contents to the 
arbitrator. The rule of federal law is that the courts 
should not intrude upon the sovereignty of the process 
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or of the arbitrator.217 The parties’ bargain is for 
arbitration, not judicial reasoning or results—unless 
the trial of arbitration is imbued with flagrant abuse or 
fundamental corruption. The Florida court’s decision 
strays far afield from those unambiguous and 
unyielding principles of federal arbitration law.218 
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       218 See also Raymond James Fin. Serv. Inc. v. Phillips, 38 
Fla. L. Weekly S 325 (Fla. 2013) (a Florida statute of 
limitations applies to an arbitral proceeding because the latter 
is a “civil action or proceeding” under the Fla. Stat. §95.11.) 
(Under the court’s analysis and its consultation of the “ordinary 
dictionary definition” of the undefined statutory term 
‘proceeding’, proceeding refers to a “tribunal” which then 
becomes “a court or other adjudicatory body” which finally can 
be described as an arbitral proceeding or arbitration.  
Therefore, the statutory phrase “civil action or proceeding” 
referred to adjudicatory bodies, a group that jesuitically 
interpreted included arbitral tribunals.  By its own terms, the 
statute of limitations applied to arbitral proceedings.)  (Instead 
of engaging in this mechanical, superficial, artificial 
discussion, the court should have discovered the true character 
of arbitration for purposes of applying state law.  The 
‘emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration’ establishes the 
attributes of arbitration for purposes of federal preemption and 
the application of state law.  The state statute of limitations, 
unless specifically chosen by the parties, placed restraints on 
the recourse to arbitration and the validity of the arbitration 
agreement.  It thereby encumbered the parties’ right to arbitrate 
under FAA §2 and did so on the basis of a forced and 
implausible statutory construction.).  See also Nappa Const. 
Mgmt., LLC v. Flynn, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 13, in which the court 
used the Stolt-Nielsen redefinition and expansion of the excess 
of authority ground in FAA §10 to permit judicial 




(vi)  SCOTUS: 
DIRECTV v. Imburgia 
 
Thereafter, in DIRECTV v. Imburgia,219 
SCOTUS underscored its commitment to the doctrine 
it articulated in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion220 on 
consumer arbitration and class action waivers. In 
doing so, it affirmed the strength of the federal 
preemption doctrine in American arbitration law and 
the absolute authority of the FAA and the emphatic 
federal policy. In the state litigation, the California 
Court of Appeal devised a strained distinction in an 
attempt to circumvent federal preemption through the 
application of contract freedom. The state court 
wanted to salvage the role of state law in the 
regulation of arbitration beyond supplying the rules 
for contract formation and validity. It also wanted to 
limit the impact of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion on 
the matters pertaining to consumer protection and the 
vindication of consumer interests.221 
The state court action was brought by two 
DIRECTV customers (Amy Imburgia and Kathy 
Greiner) who alleged that the company’s imposition 
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of early termination fees violated California law. 
DIRECTV made a motion to remove the matter to 
arbitration pursuant to a clause in the service contract; 
the state court denied the motion. DIRECTV filed an 
appeal.222 The contract contained a standard provision 
for arbitration: “any Claim either of us asserts will be 
resolved only by binding arbitration . . . .” It also 
contained a class arbitration waiver: “[n]either you 
nor we shall be entitled to join or consolidate claims 
in arbitration.”223 The effect of both provisions was to 
eliminate any possibility of class litigation between 
the contracting parties. The contract then stated that, if 
the “law of your [customer’s] state” nullified class 
waivers, it voided entirely the arbitral clause.224 In 
other words, if arbitration did not prevent class 
litigation, DIRECTV saw no benefit to arbitration and 
would have recourse to the courts. The California 
court somehow reached the conclusion that the phrase 
“law of your state” meant California law prior to the 
decision in Concepcion.225 Thereby, the contracting 
parties had deliberately agreed to have their contract 
governed by a historically-dated legal rule that 
expressly ignored developments in federal law that 
voided the legitimacy of the earlier law. 
The provisions of California law that the court 
of appeal wanted to retain at all costs were twofold: 
the Discover Bank Rule and provisions in the 
California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (§§ 1751, 
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1781[a]). Both of these frameworks included legal 
rules that voided class action waivers and protected 
the consumers’ right to engage in ‘representative’ 
litigation.226 Of course, Concepcion had only recently 
declared that class waivers in consumer contracts of 
adhesion were lawful and enforceable agreements 
pursuant to the FAA. The state court emphasized 
freedom of contract and choice-of-law to 
‘manufacture’ a make-weight argument that the 
reference to the “law of your state” meant the 
California law prior to the Concepcion validation of 
class waivers. In effect, if the parties agreed, they 
could select as the law applicable an historical version 
of the law of a state (or of a country or of another 
entity).   
This position, supplemented by a few rules of 
construction and the view that would-be ambiguity is 
counted against the contract drafter (DIRECTV), lead 
to the contrived conclusion that the parties, as they 
were entitled to do, could choose to be governed by a 
dated state law.227 The reasoning was tortured, 
transparent, and tendentious. The objective was to 
unseat the hegemony of federal law in the field of 
arbitration and to allow California to establish and 
apply its own standards in arbitration cases. 
The California Supreme Court did not grant 
discretionary review to the ruling, and even the Ninth 
Circuit could not endorse the court of appeal’s 
reasoning and conclusion. The case hardly posed an 
obstacle to SCOTUS and its arbitration doctrine. The 
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Court acknowledged that contract freedom was a vital 
principle of arbitration (to which the FAA gave 
“considerable latitude”) and that the interpretation of 
state law belonged to state courts. The state law, 
however, could not contradict and had to be 
“consistent with Federal Arbitration.”228 Moreover, 
federal law was supreme and binding on state courts: 
“consequently, the judges of every State must follow 
it.”229 In particular, “The Federal Arbitration Act is a 
law of the United States, and Concepcion is an 
authoritative interpretation of that Act.”230 
The Court surmised that the state court would 
not have engaged in a similar analysis in regard to any 
other contract. Such a ruling imposed special validity 
requirements on arbitration contracts exclusively:  
“[W]e conclude that California courts would not 
interpret contracts other than arbitration contracts the 
same way . . . . [T]he court’s interpretation of this 
arbitration contract is unique, restricted to that 
field.”231 This unique interpretation exhibits a 
particular animus toward the FAA, which eviscerates 
the role of state law in the regulation of arbitration. 
The state court decision was an intrusion and a 
trespass on federal authority. Moreover, the 
construction applied only to arbitration in a vain 
attempt to undo its impact. “The view that state law 
retains independent force even after it has been 
authoritatively invalidated by this Court” cannot be 
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accepted in general, and therefore, should not be 
accepted in the context of arbitration.232  
The California ruling’s interpretation of “law of 
your state” treats arbitration contracts differently from 
other contracts.  They are not placed “on equal footing 
with all other contracts.”233 The federal policy 
emphatically favoring arbitration is not given its due 
and is, in fact, ignored. “The Court of Appeal’s 
interpretation is pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration 
Act.”234  
 
4.  Conclusion 
Arbitration in California has been vigorously 
opposed by a judicial determination to protect the 
integrity of law, the public interest, and legal 
civilization itself. Courts exist to implement the 
legislative will and protect legal rights. Government 
supervision and control inhere in public matters. Even 
the Ninth Circuit, a federal court, believed that the 
U.S. Supreme Court decisional law on arbitration was 
excessive—violative of essential roles and 
boundaries. Federalization and preemption deprive 
states of regulatory authority within their own 
territory on matters that are significant to their 
citizens. States become victims of federalism. 
California courts have argued that arbitration should 
be confined to so-called invisible subject areas like 
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commercial contracts and the disruption of mercantile 
relationships. It should not intrude upon the 
governmental prerogative to regulate and guide 
society. 
This approach and position are not only 
contrarian and unlawful, but they also misrepresent 
the capabilities and social value of arbitration. The 
California law on arbitration looks backwards; it 
harkens to a by-gone era of American society in 
which courts played a dominant role and occupied an 
unquestioned position of authority in society. During 
that time, courts and the law had preemptive 
authority. In effect, as noted earlier, the antagonism 
between California and federal law on arbitration was 
fueled by a regenerated battle for states’ rights in the 
American political system.   
Most of the California positions and much of its 
policy on arbitration are not simply odd and 
antiquated, but dangerous as well. They deny the 
evident moral and professional failures of adversarial 
justice and, concomitantly, of judicial adjudication. 
They impede the attenuation or resolution of a 
substantial social problem. They state a preference for 
a bureaucratic approach to issues that deprecates self-
reliance and individual freedom, that deprives society 
of the benefit of the energy, thinking, and creativity of 
many of its members.   
Despite their sophisticated rhetorical and 
analytical packaging, California judicial rulings on 
arbitration have been (for the most part) the modern-
day expression of judicial hostility to arbitration. The 
SCOTUS has deemed this position unlawful under the 
89 
 
FAA. Faced with a crisis in law and adjudication, it is 
time for courts in California to heed J. William 
Fulbright’s battle cry of the 1960s; they should 
abandon “old myths” and adjust willingly and well to 
“new realities.” Society has evolved beyond its 
traditional role and function. The ‘old-time religion’ is 
simply too much for society to bear in the domain of 
civil litigation. If states can simply defy federal law at 
will and have courts rule in opposition to federal 
policy, the integrity of national government and 
federalism will be shattered. 
 
 
 
